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Surrogacy and Adoption: A Case of 
Incompatibility 
by Barbara L. Atwell* 
So the woman who has the baby is the surrogate mother. She is the 
substitute. But for what? For the real mother? No, she is the real 
mother. So, for what is she a surrogate? She is the surrogate, according 
to logic (if that is not too strong a word to use in relation to what 
lies behind this Bill or Act) for somebody who cannot have a baby. 
But that does not make her a surrogate mother, it makes her a mother. 
The woman who gets the baby is the substitute for that original mother 
who hands the baby over by a process of adoption.' 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the highly publicized case of Baby M , 2  surrogate parenting 
agreements have become a popular issue for public comment.  
While the events leading to the Baby M case began in 1985, there 
has been a resurgence of surrogate parenting3 since the 
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1. 173 PARL. DEB., H . L .  (5th ser.) 174 (1986), quoted in Means, Surrogacy 
u. The Thirteenth Amendment, IV  N.Y . L .  SCH. HUM.  RTS. ANN. 445, 445 n. 1 (1987). 
2. In re Baby M ,  109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988). 
3. The woman who agrees to bear a child in a surrogate parenting ar-  
rangement is normally referred to as the "surrogate mother." As indicated above, 
this term is misleading. In fact, the surrogate is not a surrogate mother at  all, 
but is the natural or  biological mother of the child. It is perhaps more appropriate 
to describe the surrogate as a "surrogate wife" since she substitutes for the wife 
by bearing a child for the biological father. See Means, supra note 1, at 445 n.1.  
See also THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE A N D  THE LAW, SURROGATE 
PARENTING: ANALYSIS A N D  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 1 (1988) [here- 
inafter TASK FORCE REPORT] ("'[S]urrogate mother' is a misnomer because the 
woman is actually a 'surrogate wife' for the purposes of procreation."). 
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mid-1970'~.~ A "surrogate parenting agreement" is an agreement in 
which a surrogate agrees for a fee to be impregnated through artificial 
insemination, to carry the child to term, and, after birth, to deliver 
the newborn baby to the biological father and to surrender all the 
parental rights she would otherwise have.5 It is then contemplated that 
the wife of the biological father will adopt the child.6 Legal scholars7 
4. The practice of surrogate parenting dates back to Biblical times. See 
Genesis 16:2 ("Sarai said unto [her husband] Abraham, Behold, now, the L O R D  
hath restrained me from bearing: I pray thee, go in unto my maid; it may be 
that I may obtain children by her."); Genesis 30:3 (When Rachel was unable to 
bear children for Jacob she told Jacob to "go in unto . . . [Bilhah] and she shall 
bear upon my knees, that I may also have children by her. "). See also Katz, 
Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling L a w s ,  20 COLUM. J .L.  & Soc.  PROBS. 1 
(1986). 
5. See Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a Chi ld ,  20 J .  FAM. L. 
263 (1982). Typically, the parties to a surrogate parenting agreement are the 
surrogate, the biological father, and (where appropriate) the surrogate's husband. 
In an effort to circumvent baby-selling statutes, the wife of the biological father 
is generally not a party to the contract. Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. v. 
Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Ky. 1986). The  biological 
father and his wife will generally be referred to herein as the adopting couple. 
Under this form of surrogate parenting agreement, the surrogate is both a 
' I  genetic" and "gestational" surrogate. She is a genetic surrogate because it is 
her egg that is fertilized and she therefore has a genetic link to the child. She is 
a gestational surrogate because she carries the child to term. There are other types 
of surrogate arrangements. For example, the surrogate could be a gestational 
surrogate only, that is a surrogate with no genetic relation to the child. This type 
of surrogacy occurs when another woman's already fertilized egg is implanted into 
the surrogate. This Article discusses women who are both genetic and gestational 
surrogates. 
In addition to surrogate parenting, there are several other relatively recent 
advances in reproductive technology. For example, with artificial insemination by 
donor (AID) a woman may become impregnated without intercourse. In fact, it 
is through artificial insemination that a surrogate is impregnated. In the more 
typical non-surrogate AID situation, though, a woman who has been impregnated 
would keep the child upon birth. Another of the modern reproductive technologies 
is in vitro fertilization (IVF). This form of reproduction involves fertilizing a 
woman's egg in a laboratory and subsequently re-implanting the egg in her body. 
Surrogate arrangements differ from AID and IVF in that they require the rental 
of the woman's body over a prolonged period of time. See TASK FORCE REPORT, 
supra note 3 ,  at 82. 
6. Katz, supra note 4, at  2; see infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. 
7. See, e . g . ,  Lacey, T h e  L a w  of Artificial Insemination and Surrogate Parenthood 
in Oklahoma: Roadblocks to the Right to Procreate, 22 TULSA L.J. 281 (1987); Note, 
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and other professionals8 have debated the advantages and disadvan- 
tages, the legality or illegalityg of this form of procreation. 
Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate Mothers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
1936 (1986); Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. I L L .  U .  L.J. 147; 
Stumpf, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for N e w  Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE 
L.J. 187 (1986); Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of the Problems and Suggestions 
for Solutions, 50 TENN.  L .  REV. 71 (1982); Note, An Incomplete Picture: The Debate 
About Surrogate Motherhood, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 231 (1985) [hereinafter Note, 
An Incomplete Picture]. 
8.  See, e . g . ,  Parker, Surrogate Motherhood, Psychiatric Screening and Informed 
Consent, Baby Selling, and Public Policy, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L .  21 
(1984) [hereinafter Parker, Surrogate Motherhood] (psychiatrist); Parker, Motivation of 
Surrogate Mothers: Initial Findings, 140: 1 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 11 7 (1983) [hereinafter 
Parker, Motivation] (same). 
9. There are many legal issues surrounding the validity of surrogate par- 
enting agreements. There are contract issues, for example, regarding both the 
. - 
enforceability of the agreements and the appropriate remedy, if any, for their 
breach. See, e . g . ,  Field, Surrogate Motherhood - The Legal Issues, IV N.Y.L. SCH. 
H U M .  RTS. ANN. 481 (1 987); Wolf, Enforcing Surrogate Motherhood Agreements: The 
Trouble W i t h  Specijic Performance, I V  N.Y.L.. SCH. HUM. RTS. ANN. 375 (1987). 
There is also the constitutional issue of one's privacy right of procreation. See Doe 
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.  113 (1973); Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See 
also Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control ojConception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 
69 VA. L .  REV. 405 (1983). Some commentators have suggested that surrogate 
parenting agreements must be enforced in order to avoid violating the parties' 
constitutional privacy right of procreation. Coleman, supra note 7; Black, Legal 
Problems ofSurrogak Motherhood, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 373 (1981). A better approach 
is to recognize that while there is a privacy right of procreation, the refusal to 
enforce a surrogate parenting agreement does not impair that right. See Doe v. 
Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.  1183 
(1983). If surrogate parenting agreements are not enforced, only one method of 
procreation is prohibited - not procreation generally. 
Another legal issue that arises in the context of surrogate parenting agree- 
ments is the presumption of paternity that the law imposes on the spouse of a 
woman who has been artificially inseminated with her spouse's consent. See, e . g . ,  
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (Supp. 1987) ("If, under the supervision of a licensed 
physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially 
with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as 
if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived."). Obviously, in a 
surrogate parenting arrangement, paternity is intended to rest with the biological 
father rather than with the spouse of the surrogate. In an effort to circumvent a 
similar provision in Michigan, the spouse of the surrogate signed a statement of 
' 6  nonconsent" to the insemination of his wife. Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 122 Mich. 
App. 506, 506, 333 IJ.W.2d 90, 92 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 420 Mich. 367, 
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This Article adds to the ongoing debate and suggests that, as 
currently practiced, surrogate parenting is an attempt to create a 
new form of independent adoption and that such agreements should 
not be enforced to the extent that they are incompatible with legit- 
imate and well thought-out public policies expressed in state adoption 
statutes. Adoption is the method by which the state attempts to 
provide a suitable home for children whose biological parents are 
unable or unwilling to care for them.I0 Because it results in a per- 
manent severing of the legal ties between a child and his or her 
biological parents, adoption is strictly regulated by each state." 
In an effort to ensure that the interests of all parties - the 
child, the biological parents, and the adoptive parents - are pro- 
tected, several policies are reflected in state adoption statutes. One 
such policy is to ensure that the consent of the biological parents to 
surrender the child for adoption is voluntary and informed. l 2  Another 
is to prevent children from being treated as chattel. Thus, states 
prohibit ' 'baby-selling' ' or "baby-brokering' ' - a practice that tends 
to subordinate the suitability of the home to the financial interest 
of the baby-broker.13 Finally, states seek to protect the child by 
ensuring that the adoptive parents are fi t  before they are granted 
an adoption decree.I4 Since surrogate parenting agreements are a 
form of adoption, they must conform to these policies. 
This Article explores the public policy doctrine relating to con- 
tracts generally and examines specific public policies set forth in 
state adoption statutes. The Article concludes that surrogate par- 
enting agreements are 1) incompatible with consent provisions of 
state adoption statutes, 2) inconsistent with state laws prohibiting 
baby-selling, and 3) inconsistent with state adoption provisions that 
provide for a thorough investigation of the adoptive parents in order 
to ensure that the adoption serves the child's best interests. Ac- 
cordingly, this Article suggests that as state legislatures debate the 
362 N.W.2d 211 (1985). In Baby M, the surrogate's husband also refused to consent 
to the insemination. See Surrogate Parenting Agreement between Mary Beth White- 
head, Richard Whitehead, and William Stern (Feb. 6 ,  1985), Exhibit G [hereinafter 
MBW Contract]. See infra note 145 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 48-67 and accompanying text. 
1 1 .  See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 73-108 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 109-1 19 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 120-128 and accompanying text. 
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best means of addressing the issue of surrogate parenting,I5 they 
should recognize that surrogate parenting agreements must be re- 
structured to avoid violation of adoption statutes. Surrogate parenting 
agreements that comply with adoption requirements in all respects 
except for failure to comply with adoption consent provisions should 
be voidable. Surrogate parenting agreements that violate baby-selling 
prohibitions or provisions requiring an investigation of the adoptive 
parents, however, should be void. 
Part I of this Article examines the public policy doctrine as it 
applies to traditional contract law. Part I1 explores the adoption 
process and the public policies underlying it. Part I11 examines the 
incompatibilities between surrogate parenting agreements and the 
adoption statutes. Part 1V describes the modifications required in 
the surrogate process in order to make surrogate parenting agree- 
ments enforceable and concludes by looking at surrogacy in the 
context of society at large. 
Traditional contract lawI6 permits private parties to contract 
freely without undue government interference.I7 In fact, private con- 
tractual agreements are encouraged and considered an important 
part of our free enterprise system.'* Individuals would be hesitant 
to rely on each others' promises without the assurance that those 
promises would generally be enforced. Without enforcement of prom- 
ises, it would be almost impossible to conduct private business in 
an orderly fashion. Accordingly, society has an interest in protecting 
15. Many states have recently proposed bills on the issue of surrogate 
parenting. Michigan is the first state that has actually enacted legislation. See injra 
notes 202-203 and accompanying text. 
16. "A contract is a promise or  a set of promises for the breach of which 
the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes 
as a duty." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 1 (1979). 
17. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.1 (1982) ("The principle of freedom 
of contract rests on the premise that it is in the public interest to accord individuals 
broad powers to order their affairs through legally enforceable agreements."). 
18. See, e . g . ,  Wallihan v .  Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 117, 82 S.E.2d 553, 558 
(1954) ("The law looks with favor upon the making of contracts between competent 
parties upon valid consideration and for lawful purposes."); Eisenberg, The Bargain 
Principle and Its Limits ,  95 HARV. L.  REV. 741, 744 (1982) (' 'A modern free enterprise 
system depends heavily on exchanges over time and on private planning."). 
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the expectations of contracting parties by binding them to the con- 
tracts they make.lg In an  effort to further this societal interest, courts 
normally enforce the promises of competent partiesz0 that are sup- 
ported by con~idera t ion.~ '  
Not all promises, however, are e n f o r ~ e a b l e . ~ ~  For example, a 
promise may be unenforceable due to the absence of consideration2" 
or a failure to comply with the statute of frauds.z4 An agreement 
that appears valid on its face may be unenforceable if duress,z5 undue 
19. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 
43 COLUM. L. REV.  629, 629-30 (1943). 
[The freedom to contract] became the indispensable instrument of the 
enterpriser, enabling him to go about his affairs in a rational way. 
Rational behavior within the context . o f o u r  culture is only possible if 
agreements will be respected. It requires that reasonable expectations 
created by promises receive the protection of the law. . . . [Flreedom 
of contract does not commend itself for moral reasons only; it is also 
an eminently practical principle. It is the inevitable counterpart of a 
free enterprise system. 
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Prince, Public Policy Limitations on Cohabitation Agree- 
ments: Unruly Horse or Circus Pony?, 70 M I N N .  L. REV. 163, 165 (1985). 
20. If one of the parties lacks capacity due to infancy or mental illness, the 
contract will be voidable by the party who lacks capacity. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS $ 5  12-16 (1979). See also First State Bank of Sinai v. Hyland, 399 
N.W.2d 894 (S.D. 1987); Ortelere v. Teachers' Retirement Bd., 25 N.Y.2d 196, 
250 N.E.2d 460, 303 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1969); Keser v. Chagnon, 159 Colo. 209, 
410 P.2d 637 (1966). 
21. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, at 5.1. 
22. Farnsworth, The  Past of Promise: A n  Historical Introduction to Contract, 69 
COLUM. L .  REV. 576, 591 (1969) ("No legal system devised by man has ever been 
reckless enough to make all promises enforceable."); Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 
46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 573 (1933) ("It is indeed very doubtful whether there are 
many who would prefer to live in an entirely rigid world in which one would be 
obliged to keep all one's promises instead of the present more viable system, in 
which a vaguely fair proportion is sufficient."); Inman v. Clyde Hall Drilling Co . ,  
369 P.2d 498, 500 (Alaska 1962) ("We recognize that 'freedom of contract' is a 
qualified and not an absolute right."). 
23. See, e .g . ,  State v. Bryant, 237 Kan.  47, 697 P.2d 858 (1985); Sanders 
v. Arkansas-Missouri Power Co. ,  267 Ark. 1009, 593 S.W.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1980); 
Zamore v. Whitter, 395 A.2d 435 (Me. 1978); Kirksey v .  Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 
(1845). See also A. CORBIN, CORBIN O N  CONTRACTS 167 (1963). 
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS $ 5 110-50 (1979). See also Farmer's 
State Bank v. Conrardy, 215 Kan.  334, 524 P.2d 690 (1974); Harry Rubin & 
Sons v. Consolidated Pipe Co. ,  396 Pa. 506, 153 A.2d 472 (1959). 
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) O F  CONTRACTS 55  174-76 (1979). See also Standard 
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i n f l ~ e n c e , ' ~  or mistakez7 induced one party to enter into i t .  A court ) 
may deem unenforceable a contract that is procedurally and substantively 
unconscionable.28 A court may also excuse performance under a 
contract if there is a subsequent unforeseen event amounting to 
impracticability of performance or frustration of purpose.29 Finally, 
and most importantly for purposes of this discussion, a court may 
refuse to assist in the enforcement of a contract if it concludes that 
the contract violates public 
The  proposition that a contract may be void as against public 
policy is easily articulated. T h e  definition of public policy, however, 
is much more e l u ~ i v e . ~ '  In the past, contracts that violated public 
policy were referred to as "illegal" bargains.32 T h e  current term, 
"public policy," is broader because contracts may violate public 
policy although they are not "Public policy" encompasses 
those principles designed to protect the welfare of the people.34 Thus ,  
when a party challenges the validity of an  agreement based on public 
policy, the underlying question faced by the court is whether the 
Finance Co.  v.  Ellis, 3 Haw. App. 614, 657 P.2d 1056 (1983); Marriage of 
Hitchcock, 265 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1978); Austin Instrument, Inc. v.  Loral Corp. ,  
29 N.Y.2d 124, 272 N.E.2d 533, 324 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1971). 
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS $ 177 (1979). See also Dobbins 
v .  Hupp, 562 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. Ct.  App. 1978); Agner v .  Bourn, 281 Minn. 385, 
161 N.W.2d 813 (1968). 
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS $ 5  151-58 (1979). See also An- 
derson Brothers Corp. v .  O'Meara ,  306 F.2d 672 (5th Cir .  1962); Lenawee County 
Rd. of Health v.  Messerly, 417 Mich. 17, 331 N.W.2d 203 (1982); Sherwood v. 
Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887). 
28. See Williams v .  Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,  350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir .  
1965). See also U.C.C.  $ 2-302(1) (1964). 
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS $5 261-72 (1979). 
30. See Trist v. Child, 88 U.S.  (21 Wall.) 441, 448 (1874) ("[A] contract 
may be illegal and void because i t  is . . . inconsistent with sound policy and good 
morals."). 
31. See Henningsen v .  Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 403, 161 A.2d 
69, 94 (1960) ("Public policy is a term not easily defined."). See also J.  CALAMARI 
& J .  PERILLO, CONTRACTS $ 22-1 (3d ed. 1987) (public policy is "an amorphous 
but ubiquitous concept"). 
32. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) O F  CONTRACTS $ 512 (1932). 
33. See RESTATEMEST (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8 introductory note (1979). 
34.  BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1041 (5th ed. 1979) (public policy refers to 
"[tlhat principle of law which holds that no subject can lawfully do that which 
has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good"). Public 
policy may "for the good of the community" restrict the freedom to contract. Id. 
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contract is consistent with the public interest.35 The perception of 
what is or is not in the public interest, namely public policy, changes 
with time.36 
There are two basic reasons why a court will not enforce a 
contract or  a portion thereof which offends public policy. First, by 
refusing to enforce the contract, the court hopes to deter others from 
making similar agreements. Second, the court does not want to assist 
the promisee by permitting him or her to use the judicial system to 
enforce a contract that violates public There is a greater 
reluctance to aid the promisee in these cases than there is a desire to 
help the promisor.38 
35. Anaconda Fed. Credit Union v.  West, 157 Mont.  175, 178, 483 P.2d 
909, 91 1 (1971) ("[Tlhe courts can refuse to enforce any contract which they deem 
to be contrary to  the best interests of citizens as a matter of public policy."). See . 
also Prince, supra note 19, at 170, who explains: 
T h e  phrasing of the public policy doctrine as applied to contracts has 
been fairly consistent across time and jurisdictions. T h e  Anglo-American 
courts have stated repeatedly that they will not enforce contracts that 
are contrary to public policy in that they injure the public welfare or  
interests, o r  are contrary to public decency, sound policy, and good 
morals. 
36. Wilson v. Carnley, 1 K.B. 729, 738 (1908) ("The determination of 
what is contrary to the so-called 'policy of the law' . . . necessarily varies from 
time to time. . . . The rule remains, but its application varies with the principles 
which for the time being guide public opinion."); Weeks v. New York Life 
Insurance Co . ,  128 S.C. 223, 228, 122 S.E.  586, 587 (1924) ("Public policy [is] 
a 'wide domain of shifting sands.' The  term in itself imports something that is 
uncertain and fluctuating, varying with the changing economic needs, social cus- 
toms, and moral aspirations of a people.") (quoting MacKendree v. S .  States Life 
Ins. C o . ,  112 S .C .  335, 335, 99 S.E. 806, 807 (1919)). See also A. CORBIN, supra 
note 23, § 1375, at 12 ("It must ever be borne in mind that times change, and 
that with them public policy must likewise change. A decision or a rule that is 
believed to be in accord with the general welfare today may not accord with it 
tomorrow. "). 
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) O F  CONTRACTS ch. 8 introductory note (1979). 
38. Id.  In a breach of contract case, the plaintiff is generally the promisee - 
the party who alleges that the defendantlpromisor failed to comply with the terms 
of the contract. Assume a typical breach of contract case involving a contract for 
the sale of cotton. If the buyer breaches the contract by failing to pay the contract 
price, the court,  in an action by the sellerlpromisee, will protect the seller's 
expectation interest by requiring the buyer to compensate the seller for his loss. 
This is in keeping with the societal interest in protecting the expectations of 
contracting parties which in turn furthers our free enterprise system. In a contract 
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Public policy is reflected in constitutions and statutes,39 judicial 
 decision^,^^ and rulings of administrative a g e n ~ i e s . ~ '  There has been 
greater concern, however, over judicial pronouncements of public 
policy than over public policy set forth by legislatures. There is an 
apprehension that judicial pronouncements of public policy will sim- 
ply reflect each judge's personal biases and opinions.42 Therefore it 
has been suggested that judicially created public policies would lead 
to too much unpredictability - like an "unruly horse. "43 Moreover, 
which violates public policy, though, the defendantlpromisor's promise may not 
be enforced. This is not primarily to relieve the promisor of his contractual 
responsibility since he agreed to the improper transaction, but  to deny the promisee 
the benefit of the bargain. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, at  S 5.1. 
39. "Constitutions and statutes are declarations of public policy by bodies 
of men authorized to legislate." A. CORBIN, supra note 21, S 1375, at 15. See also 
Pittsburgh, C . ,  C .  & St. L. Ry. v. Kinney, 95 Ohio St. 64, 67, 115 N.E. 505, 
507 (1916) ("It has frequently been said that . . . public policy is a composite of 
constitutional provisions, statutes, and judicial decisions. "). See also Zamboni v. 
Stamler, 847 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1988). 
An example of a public policy created by the federal Constitution is the 
Thirteenth Amendment which prohibits slavery. U.S.  CONST. amend. XIII .  See 
infra note 110 and accompanying text. 
40. T h e  public policy against the impairment of family relationships is a 
judicial creation. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, at  S 5.2. See Prince, supra note 
19. For example, there is a public policy which favors the relationship of marriage. 
E.  FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, at 5 5.4. Thus,  one court has condemned a 
cohabitation agreement as being inconsistent with the institution of marriage. 
Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 111. 2d 49, 58-59, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1208 (1979) (an agreement 
for which consideration consists in whole o r  in part of illicit sex is void). But see 
Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 113, 134 Cal. Rptr .  815, 
831 (1976) (contract between nonmarital partners is unenforceable only to extent 
that consideration is explicitly illicit). 
41. Zamboni, 847 F.2d at  82. See also Belenke v. SEC,  606 F.2d 193 (7th 
Cir .  1979). 
42. See Anaconda Fed. Credit Union v. West, 157 Mont. 175, 178, 483 
P.2d 909, 911 (1971) ("[Wlhether there is a prior expression or not the courts 
can refuse to enforce any contract which they deem to be contrary to . . . public 
policy."). Prince, supra note 19, at  172, explains: 
When the courts are without relevant legislative direction . . . they must 
focus on the specific policy standards accepted by society. Courts rely 
on their subjective perceptions to determine these societal standards. 
These perceptions will almost certainly vary depending on how judges 
view their social environment, where the environment is located and 
what the current societal morals are. 
43. Richardson v. Mellish, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824) (Burrough, J.) 
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if the opinions of each judge reflect his or her own personal view of 
what the public interest is, that view may or may not accurately reflect 
the public interest. 
When public policy is declared by a constitution or legislative 
enactment, the concern over unpredictability is reduced.44 First, it 
is easier for the court to determine what the public policy is. The 
judge is not basing the decision on his or her personal views, but 
on the policy established by a duly elected legislative body. Second, 
because the public policy is more defined, it is easier for a court to 
determine whether a contract is compatible with the public p01icy.'~ 
("I, for one, protest as my Lord has done against arguing too strongly upon public 
policy; - it is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never 
know where it  will carry you. It may lead you from the sound law. It is never 
argued at all but when other points fail."). 
44. Prince, supra note 19, at 171 ("[The] identification of public goals and 
interest can be made with more certainty when legislative enactments exist. . . . 
The basis for the statutory public policy rule is that a duly constituted, public 
representative body has established law that reflects some public interest. The  
courts are then bound to act in accordance with this statutory public policy."). 
45. Legislative declarations of public policy have increased over the years. 
Legislatures are often faster than courts in responding to matters of interest to 
their constituencies and have greater resources than a court with which to respond 
to a changing society. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, at  S 5.5.  If legislation 
explicitly provides that contracts incompatible with it are unenforceable, a court's 
function is relatively simple, and it will conclude that the contract should not be 
enforced. But when the legislature enacts a statute, i t  often omits any reference 
to the intended treatment of contracts which are incompatible with it. Then a 
court must consider the violation of public policy on one hand, while on the other 
weigh the policy favoring the enforcement of promises. Id. In Sirkin v. Fourteenth 
St. Store, 124 A.D. 384, 108 N.Y.S. 830 (1908), for example, the buyer of goods 
challenged the enforceability of a contract on public policy grounds although the 
statute which set forth the public policy did not specify that contracts inconsistent 
with it were unenforceable. In that case the plaintiff, a seller of hosiery, sued for 
the purchase price of goods it delivered to buyer. T h e  buyer defended on the 
ground that the contract had been procured through commercial bribery in violation 
of a New York statute and therefore was not enforceable. The  seller had bribed 
the buyer's purchasing agent in order to obtain the contract. The  court noted that 
while the statute did not specify how contracts procured through commercial bribery 
should be treated, the statute did, nonetheless, indicate "the public policy of the 
state." Id. at 389, 108 N.Y.S. at  833. Thus ,  the court held the contract unen- 
forceable in an effort to further the public policy and deter commercial bribery. 
The  dissent, however, argued that the express penalties imposed by the statute 
should not have been supplemented by the court. Id .  at 395, 108 N.Y.S. at 838 
(Scott, J . ,  dissenting). 
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When a court concludes that a contract violates public policy, 
it need not declare the entire contract void; instead it may refuse 
to enforce only a portion of the contract. It may also allow one 
party to enforce the contract although the other party would not be 
permitted to enforce it.46 The court thus retains some flexibility in 
determining the degree to which the contract should be enforced.+' 
Keeping in mind the general contract rules of public policy, an  
examination must be made of specific public policies that affect both 
adoption and surrogate parenting agreements. 
A. The Adoption Process 
Adoption did not exist at common law; it is entirely a creation 
of the state and is governed by state statutes.48 In general, the state 
prefers to keep children with their biological parents.49 Adoption is 
the state's response to the needs of children whose parents are unable 
or  upwilling to care for them. It is the procedure by which the state 
attempts to find a permanent home for those children who are without 
one. In general, adoption permanently severs the legal ties between 
a child and his or her biological parents.=O Since adoption is a state 
46. As Professor Farnsworth explains: 
[A] court will not necessarily condemn the entire agreement as unen- 
forceable by both parties merely because it offends public policy. A 
court may hold instead that the agreement can be enforced by one of 
the parties though i t  cannot be enforced by the other. O r  it may hold 
that part of the agreement is enforceable, though another part of it is 
not. It  is therefore more accurate to say that the agreement or  some 
part of it is unenforceable by one or both parties than to say that it is 
'void'. 
E.  FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, at  5 5.1. 
47. In the surrogate parenting context, a court could declare that the agree- 
ment could be enforced by the biological mother but not by the biological father, 
for example, in a case involving a birth defect where the biological father attempted 
to renege on his promise. 
48. In re Taggart 's Estate, 190 Cal. 493, 213 P. 504 (1923). 
49. B. JOE, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD ADOPTION 11-12 (1979). 
50. In some instances, the adopter is the stepparent o r  some other relative 
of the biological parent(s) - so that the child is able to maintain contact with 
one o r  both of the biological parents. 
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creation that permanently removes children from their biological 
parents, several states strictly construe their adoption  statute^.^' 
A couple that wants to adopt a child may generally follow one 
of two procedures. The first and often preferred52 procedure is for 
the couple to use an agency licensed by the state.53 The  license 
signifies that the state deems the agency to be an acceptable organ- 
ization for child placement.54 When a couple interested in adopting 
contacts an  agency, the agency will normally investigate the couple's 
fitness as parents.55 A child will be placed with the couple should 
the agency conclude that they are fit. The couple then petitions a 
court to approve the adoption. 
The  second option open to couples in most states is the inde- 
pendent adoption, which is also known as private placement or gray 
market adoption.56 No state-licensed agency is involved in an  in- 
dependent adoption. Instead, the adoption is arranged by a private, 
unlicensed intermediary such as an  .attorney, doctor, or  member of 
51. See, e .g. ,  Scott v.  Pulley 705 S.W.2d 666, 670 (Tenn.  C t .  App. 1985); 
Anonymous v.  Anonymous, 108 Misc. 2d 1098, 1102, 439 N.Y.S.2d 255, 255 
(Sup. C t .  1981); Matter of Doe's Adoption, 89 N . M .  606, 555 P.2d 906 (Ct.  
App. 1976). But  see Wright v. M'ysowatcky, 147 Colo. 317, 363 P.2d 1046 (1961) 
(adoption statutes should be liberally construed because of the humanitarian purpose 
they serve). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-37 (West Supp.  1988) ( L L T h i s  act shall 
be liberally construed to the end that the best interests of children be promoted."). 
52. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text. 
53. See, e.g.,  MINN.  STAT. ANN.  259.22 (West Supp. 1988) ("No petition 
for adoption shall be filed unless the child sought to be adopted has been placed 
by the commissioner of human services, the commissioner's agent, o r  a licensed 
child-placing agency. "). 
54. See, e .g . ,  IDAHO CODE 16-1602 (1979) ("'Authorized agency' means 
the department of health and welfare or  a local agency, or  a person, organization, 
corporation, benevolent society o r  association licensed or approved by the de- 
partment o r  the court to receive children for control, care, maintenance or place- 
ment."). See also ARK.  STAT. A N N .  § 9-9-202 (1977); M I N N .  STAT. ANN. § 259.21 
(West Supp.  1988). 
55. See Note, Independent Adoptions: Is  the Black and Whi te  Beginning to Appear 
in the Controversy Over Gray-Market Adoptions?, 18 DUQ. L .  REV. 629, 633 (1980). 
56. See, e .g . ,  K Y .  REV. STAT. ANN. 199.473 (Baldwin 1984) (persons other 
than licensed child-placing agencies may seek permission to place a child for 
adoption); N.Y. DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW 115-b (McKinney 1986). See also 
Note, Black-Market Adoptions, 22 CATH. LAW. 48, 54 (1976) ("In contrast to the 
sinister sound of the term, gray-market adoptions, consisting of nonagency place- 
ment with nonrelatives, are legal in most states."). 
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the clergy.57 These intermediaries are not necessarily in the business 
of child placement, but may be asked to arrange an adoption as an 
incident to their professions. Normally, the intermediary places the 
child in the prospective adoptive home. The state subsequently in- 
vestigates the fitness of the couple, and a hearing is held in which 
the adoption is granted or denied.58 In addition to the fact that in 
an  independent adoption the intermediary is not licensed by the 
state, another major difference between an agency and an inde- 
pendent adoption is that in an independent adoption the investigation 
of the prospective adoptive parents often takes place subsequent to 
the placement of the With an  agency adoption, a determi- 
nation of the prospective adoptive couple's fitness. as parents is 
generally made prior to placing a child with them.'jO 
Several commentators have criticized independent adoptions be- 
cause more abuses tend to occur through independent adoptions than 
through agency  adoption^.^' For example, a child placed for adoption 
through an independent procedure is more likely to become a victim 
of the black market.62 Moreover, some studies conclude that there 
57. See Note, supra note 55, at 629-30: 
When a person o r  couple decides to adopt a child in the United States, 
there are several vehicles through which a child can be obtained. The 
most extensively used is the adoption agency, which can be either a public 
agency - an arm of the government - or  a private agency - a 
nonprofit entity. Both types of agencies are heavily controlled through 
various state laws, rules, and regulations. In contrast to placement 
through controlled agencies is placement through unlicensed groups and 
individuals. This unlicensed placement activity [is] known alternately 
as the gray market, private placement, or  independent adoption. 
58. Id .  at 633. 
59. Note, supra note 56, at 52-53 (1976) ("In an independent adoption, 
there is seldom any requirement that adoptive parents be evaluated before 
placement. "). 
60. Note, supra note 55, at 633-34 ("When an agency places the child, 
the . . . significant change in the sequence of events is that the agency will 
investigate the prospective parents before they can receive a child." There is an 
"absence of this preplacement evaluation of the adoptive parents and their home" 
with an independent adoption.). Because of this difference in the sequence of 
events, the child's best interests are arguably not sufficiently considered in the 
independent adoption. Id.  
6 1 . See, e.g. , Podol ski, Abolishing Baby Buying: Limiting Independent Adoption 
Placement, 9 FAM. L.Q. 547 (1975); L. MCTACGART, THE BABY BROKERS: THE 
MARKETING OF WHITE BABIES I N  AMERICA (1980). 
62. A black market adoption differs from a legal private placement or  gray 
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is a greater risk that the biological parents will not receive proper 
counseling regarding the decision to place the child for adoption.63 
There also appears to be a greater risk that the placement will not 
be permanent due to some intervening problem.'j4 Because of the 
potential problems associated with independent  adoption^,^^ at least 
one state prohibits independent adoptions completely, and many oth- 
ers severely restrict thern.'j6 O n  the other hand, some commentators 
market adoption only in that the intermediary receives a disallowable fee. Since 
it is so easy to cross the line between a permitted private placement and an illegal 
black market sale of a child, the threat of a black market adoption is greater with 
independent adoptions. See Note, supra note 56, at 54. 
63. NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK 47-48 (1985) 
[hereinafter ADOPTION FACTBOOK]. Of the risks associated with independent adop- 
tions, the National Committee for Adoption concludes that perhaps "most important 
of all, [is the risk that] the biological parents [will] . . . receive little if any adequate 
counseling regarding the plan that is best for them and for the child." Id.  at 48. 
64. For example, the adopting couple may specify that they want a healthy 
child and may discover, after placement, that the child is not healthy. As a result, 
they may attempt to return the child to the biological parents. See id.  at 12. 
65. See Amatruda & Baldwin, Current Adoption Practices, 38 J .  OF PEDIATRICS 
208, 209-11 (1951); H. WITMER, E. HERZOG, E. WEINSTEIN & M. SULLIVAN, 
INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS 337-62 (1963). 
66. Massachusetts prohibits independent adoptions completely. MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 210, 11A (West Supp. 1986) (No person other than a "duly 
authorized agent or employee of the department of social services or a child care 
or [licensed] placement agency" shall "in any way offer . . . to place, locate or 
dispose of children for adoption."). 
Some states prohibit independent placement unless the placement is by the 
biological parents. See, e . g . ,  CAL. CIV. CODE 224p (West Supp. 1988) ("Any 
person other than a parent who, or any organization, association, or corporation 
that, without holding a valid and unrevoked license or permit to place children 
for adoption issued by the State Department of Social Services, places any child 
for adoption is guilty of a misdemeanor."). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-206 
(Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. 5 19-8-3 (1977); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-108 
(1981); NEB. REV. STAT. 43-701 (1961); NEV. REV. STAT. 127.240 (1979); R.I .  
GEN. LAWS 15-7-1 (1970). 
Another group of states generally prohibits independent adoptions, but pro- 
vides for limited exceptions. See, e . g . ,  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-69d (West 
1987); D.C. CODE ANN. S 32-1005 (1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-3 (Burns 
1987); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. 5 5-507 (1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 259.22 
(West Supp. 1988); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:3-39 (Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40-7-34 (1985). For a discussion of statd regulation of independent adoptions, 
see Note, Independent Adoption: The Inadequacies of State Law,  63 WASH. U.L.Q.  753, 
755-56 (1985). 
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argue that despite the foregoing risks, independent adoptions pose 
no greater threat to a child's welfare than agency adoptions.67 There 
are certain requirements, such as the investigation of the adoptive 
parents, that state laws impose before the adoption takes place ir- 
respective of whether that adoption takes place through an agency or 
through private placement. 
B. Surrogate Parenting as a Form of Adoption 
A surrogate parenting agreement is not in itself an adoption 
agreement. It is an agreement pursuant to which the biological 
mother agrees for a fee to terminate her parental rights upon the 
birth of the child and to surrender the child to the biological father.68 
A threshold question may be why surrogate parenting agreements 
must conform to existing adoption statutes. The parties to the sur- 
rogate parenting agreement contemplate that the biological father's 
wife, the stepmother, will adopt the Surrogate parenting 
agreements are, in effect, a form of independent adoption.70 Their 
ultimate goal is to make the contracting couple the legal parents of 
the child through a d ~ p t i o n . ~ '  Since surrogate parenting agreements 
67. See Note, supra note 55, at 629. See also W. MEEZAN, S. KATZ & E. 
Russo, ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES: A STUDY OF INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS 232- 
33 (1978). 
68. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
69. "In the typical case, the surrogate . . . conceives, carries the child for 
nine months, gives birth, and . . . releases her parental rights, giving up the child 
to the [contracting] couple for adoption." Katz, supra note 4, at 2 (emphasis added). 
70. The  trial court in Baby M, for example, upon declaring the surrogate 
parenting agreement valid, immediately issued a decree of adoption to Elizabeth 
Stern, the wife of the biological father. See 109 N.J. 396, 417, 537 A.2d 1227, 
1237 (1988). Although the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the trial court, 
holding that the surrogate parenting agreement was not enforceable, it acknowl- 
edged that the agreement was a form of adoption. "It strains credulity to claim 
that these arrangements, touted by those in the surrogacy business as an attractive 
alternative to the usual route leading to an  adoption, really amount to something 
other than a private placement adoption for money." Id .  at 424-25, 537 A.2d at 
1241. See also Field, supra note 9,  at  510 ("Surrogacy arrangements are sufficiently 
similar to other adoption arrangements that the same rule[s] should apply."). For 
a description of independent adoptions, see infra notes 56-67 and accompanying 
text. 
71.  There are several reasons why the adopting couple may prefer to use 
a surrogate arrangement rather than proceeding through a traditional adoption. 
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are an attempt to create a new form of independent adoption, their 
compatibility with state adoption laws is critical.72 
C .  Public Policy Interests Protected by the Adoption Process 
The public policy interests protected by the adoption process 
are reflected in three aspects of state adoption laws, all of which 
apply irrespective of whether the adoption takes place through an 
agency or private placement: the requirement of consent, the pro- 
hibition of baby-selling, and the requirement of an investigation. 
1. The Requirement of Voluntary, Informed Consent 
Every state requires that the biological parents consent to the 
adoption of their child before the adoption will be approved.73 There 
are several reasons for requiring the consent of the biological parents. 
First, the surrogate arrangement maintains a genetic link, through the biological 
father, between the adopting couple and the child. Second, the combination of the 
increased use of contraception, the higher incidence of abortion, and the reduced 
stigma attached to being a single mother has reduced the number of adoptable 
white babies. Thus  the waiting period for the adoption of a white baby may be 
as long as ten years. ADOPTION FACTBOOK, n p r a  note 63, at  52. Surrogate parenting 
presumably involves a much shorter waiting period than a traditional adoption. 
Of course, there are children of many ethnic and racial minorities as well as foreign 
and handicapped children who are available for and are waiting to be adopted. 
For couples that are more flexible, a child can be adopted in a relatively short 
period of time. See infra notes 224-30 and accompanying text. 
72. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at A-3, where the Task Force, 
in concluding that surrogate parenting agreements should be declared void as 
against public policy, included a legislative proposal "to reflect or  incorporate 
existing laws relating to adoption." 
73. See W .  MEEZAN, S. KATZ & E. RUSSO, supra note 67, at 149-50 (there 
are certain limited circumstances in which consent is not required, e.g. when the 
child has been abandoned, neglected, or abused). The  authors write: 
Before a child may be adopted the consent of the biological parents is 
required in all instances unless they have voluntarily relinquished their 
child, or  the courts have terminated the parents' rights in the child due 
to abuse or neglect, or have determined that waiver of the consent 
requirement would be in the best interests of the child. 
Id.  See also Barwin v. Reidy, 62 N.M.  183, 307 P.2d 175 (1957). 
Consent of the biological parents may also be waived or supplemented with 
the consent of the child if the child has reached a certain age. M o .  ANN. STAT. 
4 453.030 (Vernon 1986) (14 years old); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, 4 2 (Purdon 1963) 
(12 years old); R.I .  GEN.  LAWS 4 15-7-5 (1981) (14 years old). 
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One reason is the state interest in preserving the relationship between 
the child and his or her biological parents. It is generally considered 
preferable that parents and their biological offspring remain to- 
gether.74 A second, related reason for requiring consent is that the 
involuntary termination of the biological parents' rights can only 
occur under limited  circumstance^.^^ The adoption process is designed 
primarily as a mechanism for the voluntary termination of parental 
rights.76 A third reason for requiring the biological parents' consent 
to the adoption is to protect the adoptive parents from being subjected 
to the instability that would occur if the biological parents could 
freely change their minds and reclaim their Finally, consent 
is required to prevent abuses which might otherwise occur if consent 
were not required.78 Thus, without consent of the biological parents, 
74. See B. JOE, supra note 49, at 11. 
75. The involuntary termination of parental rights can normally occur when 
the parent has abandoned, neglected, or  abused the child. See, e . g . ,  IND. CODE 
Ann. S 31-3-1-6 (Bums 1987); OR. REV. STAT. S 109.324 (1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
S 15-7-7 (1981). When parental rights are involuntarily terminated, the child often 
becomes available for adoption. 
76. While parents are permitted to voluntarily terminate their parental rights 
via the state adoption process, they may not contractually agree to terminate one 
parent's parental rights independent of the adoption process. In Hawkins v. Frye, 
1988 W L  59841 (Fam. Ct .  Del. May 25, 1988) (West), a divorcing couple con- 
tractually agreed to terminate the father's parental rights. In  refusing to enforce 
this provision of the contract, the court in Frye relied on the reasoning in Baby 
M: 
[I]t is clear that a contractual agreement to abandon one's parental 
rights, or not to contest a termination action, will not be enforced in 
our courts. The Legislature would not have so carefully, so consistently, 
and so substantially restricted termination of parental rights if it had 
intended to allow termination to be achieved by one short sentence in 
a contract. 
109 N.J. 429, 537 A.2d at 1234-44. 
77. See W .  MEEZAN, S .  KATZ & E. RUSSO, supra note 67, at 150 ("[Clonsent 
affords protection to the prospective adoptive parents as a legal guarantee of the 
child's availability."). Some states, however, permit the biological parents to 
withdraw consent more easily than others. Id. Therefore, the giving of consent is 
not a total guarantee of protection for the prospective adoptive parents. 
78. See Banvin v.  Reidy, 63 N.M.  183, 191, 307 P.2d 175, 180 (1957). For 
example, kidnapping a child in order to place him or her for adoption would pose 
a greater threat if the adoption could legally occur without the consent of the 
biological parents. The consent requirement makes it more difficult for this kind 
of abuse to occur. 
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no state permits a child to be taken from them unless the child has 
been abandoned, neglected, or abused.79 
The consent that is required of the biological parent is generally 
referred to as intelligent, voluntary consent, or consent that is made 
on an informed basis.80 The consent of the biological parents must 
therefore satisfy two criteria: it must be informed and it must be 
voluntary. T o  ensure that consent to an adoption is informed, it 
must generally be made in ~ r i t i n g , ~ '  but informed consent involves 
more than the mere signing of a form.82 It is a process that involves 
an exchange of i n f o r r n a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Informed consent requires that the 
biological parents understand the implications of their decision to 
surrender their child for adoption. They must be advised by counsel, 
the court, or some other appointed person that adoption results in 
a permanent severing of their legal relationship with the If 
they are not so advised, and are not made to understand the 
79. See supra note 75. The  surrogate, by signing the surrogate parenting 
agreement and going forward with the pregnancy is arguably abandoning the child, 
but  the signing of a form prior to the child's birth cannot realistically be equated 
to the abandonment of a living child. The  better approach would be to recognize 
that, until the child is born, it is incapable of being abandoned. 
80. See, e . g . ,  FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 63.092 (West 1985) (a study shall be made 
to determine "whether the consent of the natural parent o r  parents has been given 
on an informed and voluntary basis"). See also Downs v. Wortman, 228 Ga.  315, 
315, 185 S.E.2d 387, 388 (1971) (consent must be given "freely and voluntarily"); 
In re Adoption of Susko, 363 Pa.  78, 69 A.2d 132 (1949) (consent must be intelligent, 
voluntary, and deliberate). 
81. COLO. REV.  STAT. 5 19-5-203 (1986); GA.  CODE ANN. 5 19-8-3 (1977); 
HAW. REV. STAT. 5 578-2 (1985); ME.  REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, 5 532 (1979); 
S.C.  CODE ANN.  5 20-7-1710 (Law. Co-op. 1976); VA. CODE ANN.  5 63.1-225 
(1987); W .  VA. CODE 5 48-4-3 (1986). 
82. See infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text. 
83. F. ROSOVSKY, CONSENT O TREATMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 3 (1984) 
("Consent is a process, not a form."). 
84. See W. MEEZAN, S. KATZ & E. RUSSO, supra note 67, at 150 (The purpose 
of the consent is to ensure the court that the biological parent "understands the 
implication of consenting to the adoption - that the parent-child relationship will 
be completely and permanently severed."). Thus,  in In re Cheryl E., 161 Cal. 
App. 3d 587, 207 Cal.  Rptr .  728 (1984), where a social worker informed the 
biological mother that she could change her mind within one year of signing the 
consent form, the adoption decree was set aside. See also Keheley v. Koonce, 85 
Ga .  App. 893, 70 S.E.2d 522 (1952) (attorney advised biological mother that she 
could reclaim her child within one year). 
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consequences of their actions, the consent is invalid.85 The biological 
parents should also be advised of the psychological consequences of 
their decision. They should be advised that the separation from the 
child can, and undoubtedly will, be emotionally trying.86 Many states 
attempt to ensure that the biological parents are aware of the emo- 
tional and psychological feelings which may confront them by pro- 
hibiting them from consenting to the adoption prior to the child's 
birth.87 These states recognize that until the child is born, the consent 
is necessarily uninformed. Until the child's birth, the parent is unable 
to understand how he or she will feel with respect to giving the child 
up for adoption.88 
In order to be valid, the consent of the biological parents must 
also be given voluntarily. Consent may be involuntary for a number 
85. See, for example, In  re the Adoption of Robin, 571 P.2d 850, 857-58 
(Okla. 1977), where the court explained: 
The court should thoroughly advise the relinquishing parent of the nature 
of his or  her actions, and of the seriousness of the attendant conse- 
quences. As completely as possible, the court should attempt to ascertain 
whether the natural parent has a n  intelligent comprehension of their 
[sic] action. . . . Attorneys representing adoptive parents and adoption 
agencies, as well as attorneys representing relinquishing natural parents, 
should insist that these measures be taken to fully protect their clients 
and more importantly, to avoid subsequent emotionally traumatic cus- 
todial changes of the adopted child. 
86. T h e  doctrine of informed consent does not require that the patient be 
informed of obvious risks. Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558 (D.C. 1982). It  may 
be argued that it will obviously be difficult emotionally for a biological parent to 
separate from his o r  her child. Every parent who decides to give a child u p  for 
adoption undoubtedly is aware that it may be extremely painful. In fact, though, 
the emotional aspect is such an important matter for a parent to understand in 
the course of making his or her decision that it should not go unaddressed. T h e  
consideration of emotional repercussions is something which proper counselling 
can likely facilitate. Therefore, counselling ought to be given. 
87. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. 
88. See Keheley v. Koonce, 85  Ga .  App. 893, 900-01, 70 S.E.2d 522, 527 
(1952), where the court, quoting the policy of the Fulton County Welfare De- 
partment, explained: "'We do not accept releases before birth; we d o  not accept 
them until sometime after the child is born because mothers d o  change their minds 
and we want to give them time in which to be sure they want to release the 
child."' 
See also Gaffney, Mate~nal -Fe ta l  Attachment in Relation to Self-Concept and A n x - 9 ,  
15 MATERNAL-CHILD NURSING J .  91 (1986) (author discusses the bonding between 
mother and child that occurs during pregnancy). See infra notes 137-142 and 
accompanying text. 
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of reasons. For example, consent given by the biological parents 
based on duress is not considered v ~ l u n t a r y ; ~ ~  nor is it voluntary 
89. Assuming that competent parties have entered into a contract, courts 
generally attempt to enforce their expectations. See discussion supra note 18. If, 
however, there is improper conduct on the part of one of the parties during the 
bargaining process amounting to duress, a court may allow the other party to 
avoid the transaction. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, at  5 5  4.9, 4.16. While every 
bargain generally involves some degree of coercion, duress refers to coercion to 
such a degree that the assent given has not been given freely. I d .  at 5 4.9. Duress 
is an improper threat which induces the other party's assent by leaving "no reasonable 
alternative." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 5 175(1) (1979). 
Normally, the threat of withholding a financial incentive is not considered 
sufficient in itself to constitute duress. In fact, duress was once limited to threats 
of physical harm and was only later expanded to include threats involving economic 
duress. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, at 5 4.17. See also Dawson, Economic Duress - 
An Essay in Perspectiue, 45 MICH. L .  REV. 253, 255 (1947). Recently, courts have 
begun to expand the doctrine of duress. Thus,  it is impossible to create a bright 
line test for determining which threats constitute duress and which do  not. Some 
commentators have suggested that the courts should focuson the unfairness of the 
bargain rather than on the impropriety of the threat. I d .  at  286. Moreover, the 
surrounding circumstances should be considered, including the victim's "age and 
background, the relationship of the parties, and the availability of disinterested 
advice." E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, at  5 4.18. 
Duress, in the adoption conttxt, is "defined . . . according to its generally 
understood meaning, to signify that condition which exists where one is induced 
by the unlawful act of another to make a contract or to perform or forego an  act 
under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of his free will." Scott v. 
Pulley, 705 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Tenn. C t .  App. 1985). It is extremely difficult to 
prove duress in adoption cases. There is a general recognition that parents will 
not place a child for adoption if they are not faced with some unfortunate cir- 
cumstance. This "duress of circumstance" is not generally sufficient to vitiate the 
consent of the biological parents. As the court in Barwin v. Reidy explained: 
If consents to adoption were ineffective every time this sort of duress 
entered the picture, it is difficult to see how any adoption where consent 
is required could be allowed to stand, for what natural parent would 
ever consent to the adoption of his or her child in the absence of duress 
of circumstance? 
62 N.M.  183, 198, 307 P.2d 175, 185 (1957) (The court went on to find, however, 
that impermissible payments to the biological parents vitiated consent.). Other 
courts have also held that duress of circumstance is not sufficient to vitiate consent. 
See Wooten v. Wallace, 351 S.E.2d 72, 74 (W.  Va.  1986) ("'Duress of circumstance' 
has generally been held insufficient to void an otherwise valid consent to adopt. "); 
In re Adoption of E.W.C. ,  389 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749 (Surr. Ct .  1976) ("No statute 
has said that surrenders are valid only if executed free from emotion, tensions and 
pressures caused by [trying circumstances]."). 
Findings of duress have generally been limited to cases where the biological 
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when based on undue influence,g0 fraud,g' or mistake.92 Consent is 
also not considered voluntary when it is Thus, states pro- 
hibit biological parents from receiving a fee in exchange for their 
consent to place a child for adoption. The prohibition of such fees 
along with the prohibition on pre-birth consent must be explored 
further in order to understand how they facilitate the states' policy 
of ensuring that consent is voluntary and informed. 
a .  Consent Prior to Birth 
Many adoption statutes expressly prohibit the biological parents 
from consenting to an adoption prior to the child's birth.94 In other 
parent consented while under the effects of medication o r  under extreme pressure 
from family members. See Wuertz v. Craig, 458 So. 2d 1311 (La. 1984) (mother 
was threatened with criminal abuse charges); Adoption of Robin, 571 P.2d 850 
(Okla. 1977) (stepmother threatened to kill biological mother and her father); In 
re Adoption of Susko, 363 Pa. 78, 69 A.2d 132 (1949); Huebert v. Marshall, 132 
Ill. App. 2d 793, 270 N.E.2d 464 (1971). 
90. Undue influence is similar to the doctrine of duress but is a doctrine 
which grew up  in equity "to give relief to victims of unfair transactions that were 
induced by improper persuasion." E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, at $ 4.9. "In 
contrast to the common law notion of duress, the essence of which was simple fear 
induced by threat, the equitable concept of undue influence was aimed at  the 
protection of those affected with a weakness, short of incapacity, against improper 
persuasion, short of misrepresentation or duress, by those in a special position to 
exercise such persuasion." Id. at $ 4.20. Two elements are normally required to 
make a case of undue influence: "a special relation between the parties" and 
"improper persuasion of the weaker by the stronger." Id.  at $ 4.19. See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) O F  CONTRACTS $ 177 (1979). 
In adoption cases, undue influence and duress are often not clearly distin- 
guished from one another, and the definition of undue influence has been described, 
like duress, as force or  coercion that deprives one of his o r  her free will. See In 
re Adoption of a Minor Child, 109 R . I .  443, 452, 287 A.2d 115, 119 (1972) ("A 
finding of undue influence is warranted only when the evidence shows that the 
influence has been exerted to such a degree as to amount to force or  coercion so 
that the actor's free agency is destroyed."). 
91. In re the Adoption of Robin, 571 P.2d 850, 857-58 (Okla. 1977) (The 
court must "determine whether the action is taken voluntarily, without being 
obtained by reason of fraud, duress, o r  promise by another."). See also In re Steve 
B.D., '111 Idaho 285, 723 P.2d 829 (1986). 
92. See, e . g . ,  In re Adoption of Anonymous, 60 Misc. 2d 854, 859, 304 
N.Y.S.2d 46, 52 (1969) (lack of adequate counselling); In re D, 408 S.W.2d 361 
(Mo. Ct .  App. 1966). 
93. See infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text. 
94. See, e . g . ,  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.  $ 8-107 (1983) ("A consent given 
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states, where there is no express statutory prohibition against giving 
consent to an adoption prior to birth, statutes have nevertheless been 
construed to imply such a p r ~ h i b i t i o n . ~ ~  States with such a prohibition 
before seventy-two hours after the birth of the child is invalid."); CONN. GEN.  
STAT. ANN.  5 45-61c(d) (West Supp. 1987) ("No consent to termination by a 
mother shall be executed within forty-eight hours immediately after the birth of 
her child."); FLA. STAT. ANN.  5 63.062 (West 1977) ("[A] petition to adopt a 
minor may be granted only if written consent has been executed after the birth of 
the minor" by the natural mother andlor father.) (emphasis supplied); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. 5 63.082 (West 1978) ("The consent shall be executed only after the birth 
of the child."); GA.  CODE ANN. 5 19-8-4 (Supp. 1987) ("A surrender . . . shall 
be executed following the birth of the child."); ILL. REV.  STAT. ch. 40, para. 1511 
(1973) ("A consent o r  a surrender taken not less than 72 hours after the birth of 
the child is irrevocable. . . . No consent or  surrender shall be taken within the 72 
hour period immediately following the birth of the child."); IND.  CODE ANN. 
5 31-3-1-6 (Supp. 1987) ("The consent to adoption may be executed at any time 
after the birth of the child."); IOWA CODE ANN. 5 600A.4 (West 1977) (A release 
of custody must be signed "not less than seventy-two hours after the birth of the 
child."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 199.500 (MichieIBobbs-Merrill 1987) ("In no 
case shall . . . consent for adoption be held valid if such consent . . . is given 
prior to the fifth day after the birth of the child."); MD.  FAM. LAW CODE ANN. 
5 5-324 ("The court may not enter a final adoption decree until at least 15 days 
after the birth of the individual to be adopted."); MISS. CODE ANN. 5 93-17-5 
("[Clonsent shall be duly sworn to or  acknowledged and executed . . . not before 
three (3) days after the birth of [the] child."); NEV. R E V .  STAT. 5 127.070 (1987) 
("All releases for and consents to adoption executed by the mother before the birth 
of a child are invalid."); N .H.  REV. STAT. ANN.  § 170-B:7 (1973) ("No consent 
or  surrender shall be taken until a passage of a minimum of 72 hours after the 
birth of the child."); N.D. CENT. CODE 5 14-15-07 (1981) ("The required con- 
sent . . . shall be executed at  any time after the birth of the child."); O H I O  REV. 
CODE ANN. 5 3107.08 (Baldwin 1977) ("The required consent to adoption may 
be executed at any time after seventy-two hours after the birth of a minor."); 
T E N N .  CODE ANN. § 36-1-1 14 (1986) ("In no event shall a surrender [of a child] 
made prior to the birth of the child be effective."); W .  VA.  CCDE 5 48-4-5 (1985) 
(Consent may be revoked if executed prior to "seventy-two hours after birth of 
the child."). But see WASH. REV. CODE 5 26.33.090 (Supp. 1988) (consent may 
be given prior to birth unless the child is an Indian). 
95. In re Baby M ,  109 N.J. 396, 422, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (1988) ("[Tlhe 
natural mother's irrevocable agreement, prior to birth, even prior to conception, 
to surrender the child to the adoptive couple . . . is totally unenforceable in private 
placement adoption. Even where the adoption is through a n  approved agency, the 
formal agreement to surrender occurs only afier birth, and then, by regulation, 
only after the birth mother has been offered counseling.") (citations omitted) 
(emphasis in original); J .D.  ex rel. J .D .  v. L . D . P . ,  713 P.2d 1191, 1193, aff 'd ,  
719 P.2d 1370 (Wyo. 1986); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 108 Misc. 2d 1098, 1101- 
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recognize that it is impossible for consent to be given on an informed, 
intelligent basis prior to the child's birth. Accordingly, in these 
jurisdictions, the parents may revoke consent given prior to the birth 
of the child. Moreover, many states provide that even if the biological 
parents give consent after the child's birth, that consent may be 
revoked with relative ease within a short period of time.96 
One reason to prohibit pre-birth consent is to protect the bio- 
logical parents from making a hasty, ill-considered, and uninformed 
decision about the adoption.97 Prohibitions are also based on the 
recognition that pregnancy and childbirth can be a woman's most 
personal and emotional experience. Bonding between mother and 
child may take place during pregnancy and at birth. "Attachment 
begins with the . . . sensations created by fetal movement which 
02, 439 N.Y.S.2d 255, 260 (Queens Cty. 1981) ("In the opinion of this court, 
any consent to adoption of an unborn child is not in conformance with statute. . . . 
The  court holds that for the purposes of this statute and for reasons of public 
policy, an  unborn child was never intended to be included in the definition of a 
person."); In re Adoption of R.A.B., 426 So. 2d 1203, 1205 (Fla. Dist. C t .  App. 
1983); Korbin v. Ginsberg, 232 So. 2d 417, 418 (Fla. 1970); In re Adoption of 
Kreuger, 104 Ariz. 26, 30, 448 P.2d 82, 86 (1969). See also ADOPTION FACTBOOK, 
supra note 63, at 76-85, where the only state listed as permitting pre-birth consent 
is the State of Washington. 
96. See, e . g . ,  TENN. CODE ANN. 8 36-1-1 17 (Supp. 1988) ('LProvided a petition 
to adopt has not been filed, any parent(s) who has surrendered a child for adoption 
shall have the absolute right to revoke the surrender within fifteen (15) days from 
the date of the execution of the surrender . . . ."). 
See also ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.070 (1983) ("A consent to adoption may be 
withdrawn before the entry of a decree of adoption, within 10 days."). Cf. DEL. 
CODE ANN.  tit. 13, 8 909 (Supp. 1988); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. 8 5-311 (1984). 
97. See, e . g . ,  MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. 8 303 (1984) ("The purpose of 
this subtitle [is] to protect . . . the natural parents from a hurried or ill-considered 
decision to give a child up."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.  170-B:l (1973) ("The 
policies and procedures for adoption . . . [have] as their purpose . . . protection 
of . . . [tlhe natural parent or  parents, from hurried and coerced decisions to give 
up the child."). See also Note, Surrogate Motherhood Legislation: A Sensible Starting 
Point, 20 IND.  L .  REV. 879, 888 (1987) ("The purpose of the law is to prevent 
an expectant mother from making a hasty and later regretful decision to give up 
her child for adoption."). Thus  the biological parents are  permitted to choose, 
after the birth of the child, whether to go forward with the adoption. See Surrogate 
Parenting Associates v. Commonwealth ex ref. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 213 
(Ky. 1986) ("The policy of the . . . consent to adoption statute is to preserve to 
the mother her right of choice regardless of decisions made before the birth of the 
child."). 
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validate the mother's awareness of another - an awareness that 
continues throughout pregnancy. " 9 8  Thus, a woman who bonds with 
the child during pregnancy or at birth is in a tragic situation if she 
is forced to give her child up for adoption based on consent given 
prior to the birth of the child. State permission to give consent prior 
to birth would leave the biological mother with no recourse but to 
complete the adoption. States that prohibit biological parents from 
granting consent to adopt prior to the child's birth explicitly and 
implicitly recognize that bonding between a biological mother and 
her child may occur, to varying extents, during the course of the 
pregnancy as well as at birth. Thus,  pre-birth consent is strongly 
disfavored. 
b. Financial Incentive 
States also seek to ensure voluntary consent by prohibiting pay- 
ment of fees to the biological parents in order to induce their consent.99 
98. See Gaffney, supra note 88, at  92. See also Hersh & Levin, How Love 
Begins Between Parent and Child, in SELECTED READINGS ON MOTHER-INFANT BONDING 
29 (1979) ("[Olnce the child arrives the mother love that so strongly shapes the 
infant's future unfolds in a complex and wonderful pattern. This mysterious process 
begins before birth."); Kennell, Voos & Klaus, Parent-Infant Bonding, in id. at 62 
("After [fetal movement] a woman will usually begin . . . developing a sense of 
attachment and value toward [the infant]. "). 
99. See, e . g . ,  ALA. CODE § 26-10-8 (1940) ("It shall be unlawful for any 
[unlicensed] person . . . to . . . hold out inducements to parents to part with their 
offspring."); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114 (Supp. 1987) ("[A] person shall not 
be directly o r  indirectly compensated for giving . . . consent to place a child for 
adoption."); ARK.  STAT. ANN. 5 9-9-206 (1977) ("Under no circumstances may 
a parent or  guardian of a minor receive a fee, compensation, o r  any other thing 
of value as a consideration for the relinquishment of a minor for adoption."); 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 (West 1967) ("It is a misdemeanor for any person . . . 
to pay money or anything of value, to a parent for . . . the consent to an adoption."); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-115 (Supp. 1987) ( ' 'No person shall offer [or] give . . . 
any money or other consideration o r  thing of value in connection with the consent 
to adoption."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 928 (1953) ("No natural parent of any 
child whose adoption is proposed shall receive any contribution, fee or  emolument 
of any sort from any person . . . having any connection . . . with the placement 
of the child for adoption or with the adoption."); FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 63.212 (West 
Supp. 1987) ("It is unlawful for any person . . . [hlaving the rights and duties 
of a parent with respect to the care and custody of a minor to assign or transfer 
such parental rights for the purpose of, incidental to, or  otherwise connected with, 
selling or offering to sell such rights and duties."); GA.  CODE ANN. 5 19-8-19 
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Most states, however, permit the adopting couple to reimburse the 
biological parents for medical expenses incurred in connection with 
the pregnancy and childbirth. loo Some states also permit the adopting 
parents to pay the legal fees incurred by the biological parents, and 
some go so far as to allow the biological parents to be reimbursed 
for living expenses incurred during pregnancy.'O1 No state, however, 
(Supp. 1984) ("It shall . . . be unlawful for any [unlicensed] person . . . to hold 
out inducements to parents to part with their children."); IND. CRIM. CODE 5 35- 
46-1-9 (1980) ("[A] person who, with respect to an  adoption, transfers . . . any 
property in connection with . . . the termination of parental rights, [or] the consent 
to adoption . . . commits . . . a class D felony."); IOWA CODE ANN. 5 600.9 (West 
1977) ("A natural parent shall not receive any thing of value as a result of the 
natural parent's child or former child being placed with and adopted by another 
person."); MICH.  COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 710.54 (West Supp. 1987) ("[a] person 
shall not offer, give, or receive any money or other consideration or thing of value 
in connection with . . . [a] consent [for adoption]"); S.C. CODE ANN. 5 20-7-1690 
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) ("Under no circumstances may a parent. . . receive a 
fee, compensation, or any other thing of value as consideration for consent or  
relinquishment for the purpose of adoption."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 5 25- 
6-4.2 (1984) ("Any person who offers . . . any money or other consideration or  
thing of value . . . relating to the consent to adoption . . . is guilty of a . . . 
felony."); TENN. CODE ANN. 5 36-1-135 (1978) ("it is unlawful for any [unlicensed] 
person . . . [hlaving the rights and duties of a parent with respect to the care and 
custody of a minor to assign or  transfer such parental rights for the purpose of, 
incidental to, or otherwise connected with, selling or  offering to sell such rights 
and duties"); UTAH CODE ANN. 5 76-7-203 (1973) (No payment may be made to 
the biological mother "for the purpose of inducing the mother, parent, or  legal 
guardian to . . . consent to the adoption, or co-operate in the completion of the 
adoption."); WIS. STAT. ANN. 5 946.716 (1981) (Any person who, "[iln order to 
receive a child for adoption, gives anything exceeding the actual cost of the hospital 
and medical expenses of the mother and the child incurred in connection with the 
child's birth, and of the legal and other services rendered in connection with the 
adoption" commits a Class E felony.). 
100. See, e . g . ,  MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. 5 5-327 (1984) ("This subsection 
[barring baby-selling] does not prohibit the payment, by any interested person, of 
reasonable and customary charges or fees for hospital or  medical or  legal services. "); 
ARK. STAT. ANN. 5 9-9-206 (1977) (''[Ilncidental costs for prenatal, delivery, and 
postnatal care may be assessed, including reasonable housing costs, food, clothing, 
general maintenance, and medical expenses, if they are reimbursements for expenses 
incurred or fees or  services rendered."). See also Gray v. Maxwell, 206 Neb. 385, 
392, 293 N.W.2d 90, 95 (1980). 
101. See In re Baby Girl D, 512 Pa. 449, 451, 517 A.2d 925, 927 (1986) 
("Traditionally, allowable expenses to adoptor parents have been limited to rea- 
sonable unreimbursed lying-in expenses, reasonable legal fees incident to the adoption 
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permits a fee to be paid to the biological parents in exchange for 
their agreement to surrender the child. The prohibition of such fees 
is an acknowledgement that the financial incentive may induce a 
biological parent to consent to an adoption of a child whom he or 
she would otherwise keep. In Downs v. Wortman, for example, the 
court held that an offer to pay the airfare for the biological mother 
to go to Illinois where her parents lived vitiated her consent.'02 In 
Downs, it was unclear whether the offer to pay the airfare was made 
directly by the adoptive parents or through an intermediary. The 
court recognized that regardless of the source, the mother's desire 
to visit her parents may have overcome her ability to make a vol- 
untary decision about the adoption and concluded that the contract 
was void as against public policy.lo3 The court distinguished between 
payments made for the benefit of the biological parent and payments 
made for the benefit of the child. It concluded that while the latter 
are permissible, the former violate public policy.Io4 In Barwin v. 
Reidy,'05 the court explained the reason for permitting payments which 
benefit the child: 
It is commonly the case that persons wishing to adopt a 
child will make provision with its mother, or mother and 
proceedings and costs of the proceeding."). See also Barwin v. Reidy, 62 N.M. 
183, 193, 307 P.2d 175, 181-83 (1957); Adoption of Baby Girl Fleming, 471 Pa. 
73, 80, 369 A.2d 1200, 1204 (1977); In re Stone's Adoption, 398 Pa. 190, 195, 
156 A.2d 808, 811 (1959). It has been suggested that the payment by the adoptive 
parents of the biological parent's legal fees is not advisable since it may affect the 
attorney's ability to adequately represent the biological parents. See Petition of 
Steve B.D., 11 1 Idaho 285, 289, 723 P.2d 829, 836 (1986). 
102. Downs v. Wortman, 228 Ga. 315, 315, 185 S.E.2d 387, 388 (1971) 
(The court explained, based on these facts, that "the consent to the adoption, at 
least as to the natural mother, was not freely and voluntarily given."). See also 
Scott v. Pulley, 705 S.W.2d 666, 669 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) ("'Moral duress' 
consists in imposition, oppression, undue influence, or the taking of undue ad- 
vantage of the business or financial stress or extreme necessities or weakness of 
another, and relief is granted in such cases on the basis that the par9  benefitin! 
thereby has received money, property, or other advantages. ") (emphasis supplied). 
103. Downs,  228 Ga. at 315, 185 S.E.2d at 388. See also Gordon v. Cutler, 
324 Pa. Super. 35, 471 A.2d 449 (1983); Gray v. Maxwell, 206 Neb. 385, 293 
N.W.2d 90 (1980). 
104. Downs,  228 Ga. at 315, 185 S.E.2d at 388. While the court in Downs 
did not speak in terms of undue influence, this was arguably the de facto conclusion 
of the court. See also In re Baby Girl D ,  512 Pa. 449, 517 A.2d 925 (1986). 
105. 62 N.M. 183, 307 P.2d 175 (1957). 
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father, before birth of the child, to pay hospital and medical 
expenses in connection with the care of the mother and 
child. There is nothing in this practice inimical to public 
policy. Indeed, it is productive of the welfare of the child 
that the child and the mother have adequate medical at- 
tention which perhaps would not otherwise be provided.lo6 
Payments made to the biological parents simply for their own benefit, 
however, constitute baby-selling.'07 Other courts have endorsed the 
distinction between payments for the benefit of the child and those for 
the benefit of the biological parents.Io8 
The extensive consent provisions in adoption statutes reflect a 
recognition by the states that an agreement to surrender a child for 
adoption is different in kind, not just in degree, from an ordinary 
commercial contract. Thus, special measures must be taken to ensure 
that the consent of the biological parents is valid. T o  ensure that 
the consent of the biological parents is informed, many states prohibit 
them from giving pre-birth consent; to ensure that it is voluntary, 
states prohibit them from being paid to consent to the surrender of 
their child. 
2. Prohibition of Baby-Selling 
Baby-selling or baby-brokering is prohibited irrespective of whether 
there is consent by the biological parents. Every state prohibits 
baby-selling,'Og either through adoption statutes, penal codes, or 
106. Id. at 196, 307 P.2d at 184. 
107. Id. 
108. Franklin v. Biggs, 14 Or .  App. 450, 513 P.2d 1216 (1973) (Court held 
that consent was vitiated, and set aside an adoption decree, in part because of a 
$200 payment made by the adoptive parents to the biological mother for her to 
leave the state.); Gray v. Maxwell, 206 Neb. 385, 293 N.W.2d 90 (1980) (Agree- 
ment to pay for medical expenses which had already been paid by the Department 
of Public Welfare vitiated the biological mother's consent.). 
109. While the laws of each state vary, an example is MD. FAM. LAW CODE 
ANN. 5 5-327 (1984), which provides in pertinent part: 
(1) An agency, institution, or individual who renders any service in 
connection with the placement of an individual for adoption may not 
charge or receive from or on behalf of either the natural parent of the 
individual to be adopted, or from or  on behalf of the individual who 
is adopting the individual, any compensation for the placement. 
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otherwise.'1° Such prohibitions against baby-selling are a recognition 
110. ALA. CODE 4 26-10-8 (1986) ("It shall be unlawful for any [unlicensed] 
person . . . to advertise that they will adopt children or . . . hold out inducements 
to parents to part with their offspring . . . ."); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 4 8-114 
(1987) ("[A] person . . . shall not be directly or  indirectly compensated for giving 
or obtaining consent to place a child for adoption."); CAL. PENAL CODE 4 273 
(West 1988) ("It is a misdemeanor for any person . . . to pay money or  anything 
of value, to a parent for the placement for adoption . . . of his child."); COLO. 
REV. STAT. 5 19-5-213 (Supp. 1987) ("No person shall . . . charge, or receive any 
money or other consideration or  thing of value in connection with the relinquishment 
and adoption . . . ."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, 5 928 (1975) ("No person or 
organization who is in any way connected with an  adoption shall receive any 
remuneration in connection therewith . . . ."); FLA,. STAT. ANN. § 63.212 (West 
Supp. 1987) ("It is unlawful for any person . . . [t]o sell or surrender, or to arrange 
for the sale or surrender of, a child to another person for money or anything of 
value or to receive such minor child for such payment or  thing of value."); GA. 
CODE ANN. 4 19-8-19 (1982) ("It shall . . . be unlawful for any . . . [unlicensed] 
person . . . directly or indirectly to hold out inducements to parents to part with 
their children."); IDAHO CODE 5 18-1511 (1987) ("Any person . . . who shall sell 
or  barter any child for adoption or for any other purpose, shall be guilty of a 
felony . . . . "); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1526 (1980) ("No person . . . except 
a child welfare agency . . . shall receive or accept, or pay or  give any compensation 
or thing of value . . . for placing out of a child . . . ."); IND. CODE ANN.  4 35- 
46-1-9 (Burns 1985) ("[A] person who, with respect to adoption, . . . receives any 
property in connection with the . . . adoption . . . commits . . . a . . . felony."); 
IOWA CODE ANN.  5 600.9 (West 1983) ("Any person assisting in any way with the 
placement or adoption of a minor person shall not charge a fee which is more 
than usual, necessary, and commensurate with the services rendered."); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 4 199.590 (MichieIBobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) ("No person . . .  . may 
sell or  purchase or  procure for sale or purchase any child for the purpose of 
adoption . . . ."); M D .  FAM. LAW CODE ANN. 4 5-327 (1984) ("An . . . individual 
who renders any service in connection with the placement of an individual for 
adoption may not . . . receive . . . any compensation for the placement."); MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 210, 4 11A (Law. Co-op. 1986) (No person shall "accept payment 
in the form of money or  other consideration in return for placing a child for 
adoption."); MICH.  COMP. LAWS ANN. 4 710.54 (West Supp. 1988) ("[A] person 
shall not offer, give, or receive any money or  other consideration or  thing of value 
in connection with . . . [tlhe placing of a child for adoption."); NEV. REV. STAT. 
4 127.290 (1987) ("[Nlo person who does not have . . . a license to operate a 
child-placing agency may request or accept . . . any compensation . . . for placing, 
arranging the placement of, or  assisting in placing or arranging the placement of, 
any child for adoption . . . ."); N.J. STAT. ANN. 4 9:3-54 (West Supp. 1988) ("No 
person . . . shall . . . [tlake, receive, accept or agree to accept any money or any 
valuable consideration" in connection with an adoption.); N.Y. Soc.  SERV. LAW 
§ 374 (McKinney 1983) ("[Nlo person may . . . receive any compensation . . . in 
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on the part of the states that the placement of a child with an 
adoptive family should be based on the best interests of the child, 
not on the profit motive of the individual arranging the p l a~emen t . "~  
Therefore, no state permits a person to profit from the independent 
placement of a child for a d ~ p t i o n . " ~  For example, if the attorney, 
physician, or other intermediary who arranges an independent adop- 
tion were permitted to profit from the transaction, the temptation 
would arise to place the child with adoptive parents who would pay 
the highest price for the child rather than with parents who would 
act in the child's best interest.'I3 In fact, one criticism of independent 
connection with . . . adoption of a child . . . ."); N.C.  GEN. STAT. 5 48-37 (1984) 
(No unlicensed placement organization shall "offer or give, charge or accept 
any . . . compensation . . . for receiving or placing, arranging the placement of, 
or assisting in placing or arranging the placement of, any child for adoption."); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5 3107.10 (Baldwin 1988) (Petitioner in any proceeding 
for the adoption of a minor child permitted to pay only for prenatal care, including 
hospital care, attorneys' fees, agency expenses, and temporary costs of routine 
maintenance for the child.); O R .  REV. STAT. § 109.31 1 (Supp. 1988) ("No person 
shall charge, accept or pay . . . a fee for locating a minor child for adoption . . . ."); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 5 25-6-4.2 (1984) ("Any person who . . . receives any 
money or other consideration or thing of value in connection with the placing of 
any child for adoption . . . is guilty of a . . . felony."); T E N N .  CODE ANN. 5 36- 
1-135 (1984) ("It is unlawful for any [unlicensed] person . . . [t]o [receive,] sell 
or surrender a child . . . for money or anything of value . . . ."); UTAH CODE 
ANN. 5 76-7-203 (1978) ("Any person . . . who sells, or disposes of, . . . any child 
for and in consideration of the payment of money or  other thing of value is guilty 
of a felony . . . ."); W ~ s c .  STAT. ANN. 5 946.716 (1982) ("Whoever . . . [fjor 
anything of value, solicits, negotiates or arranges the placement of a child for 
adoption" is guilty of a felony.). See Katz, supra note 4, at 6-10. The United States 
Constitution, which prohibits slavery, and thus the sale of human beings, also 
prohibits baby-selling. U.S.  CONST. amend. XIII. 
111. See In re Baby Girl D, 512 Pa. 449, 454, 517 A.2d 925, 927 (1986) 
("The reason for the limitations on fees are obvious. . . . [Tlhe limitations ensure 
that children will be placed in homes that promote their needs and welfare. . . . 
Although financial considerations are certainly a factor, placement of children in 
adoptive homes should not rest solely on the wealth of the adoptors.") (citation 
omitted). 
112. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. Most states do, however, 
permit licensed agencies to collect fees to cover the expenses incurred in connection 
with the adoption. See, e . g . ,  NEV. REV. STAT. 5 127.290 (1987) ("A licensed child- 
placing agency may accept fees for operational expenses."). Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN.  
§ 9:3-54 (West Supp. 1977); N .C .  GEN. STAT. 5 48-37 (1984); OHIO REV. CODE 
5 3107.10(4) (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. 36-1-135(a) (1984). 
113. Note, supra note 56, at 50 ("The priorities present in a normal adoption 
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adoptions is that at best only a superficial investigation is conducted 
concerning the fitness of the prospective adoptive parents.Il4 
The baby-selling provisions are designed to prevent the treatment 
of children as chattel and to eliminate the black market.ll5 There is 
a recognition that a human life is unique; it is not to be treated as 
an ordinary commercial commodity.116 Instead, the state has an 
interest in protecting the welfare of the life involved - the child. 
At least one state prevents the potential occurrence of baby- 
selling by an absolute prohibition against independent adoptions."' 
In this state, even individuals such as priests, doctors, and lawyers 
are not permitted to arrange for the placement of a child. Instead, 
child placement must be conducted by a state-authorized a g e n ~ y . " ~  
Other states permit independent adoptions, but in these states the 
are completely reversed [in the black-market]; the welfare of the baby and the 
natural mother, as well as the fitness of the adoptive parents, are subordinated to 
the profit motive of the black marketeer."). 
114. ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 63, at 47; Katz, supra note 4, at 11- 
12 ("In any private placement, especially in a black market transaction, the child 
benefits from few, if any, agency safeguards. The adoptive parents need not show 
the black marketeer that they are indeed fit for parenthood, only that they can 
afford his fee.") (footnote omitted). 
115. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 39 (Baby-selling prohibition de- 
signed "'to prevent trafficking in babies, the buying and selling, in effect, of 
human beings. "'), quotinf In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 58 A.D. 1, 
1, 395 N.Y.S.2d 645, 648 (1977); Katz, supra note 4, at 10 ("[Wlhile the [baby- 
selling] laws may vary from state to state . . . all share the basic objective of 
curbing and eliminating the baby black market."). C f .  Children's Aid Society v.  
Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 92, 66 A.2d 300, 304 (1949) ("That a child cannot be made 
the subject of a contract with the same force and effect as if it were a mere chattel 
has long been established law."); Surrogate Parenting Associates v. Commonwealth 
ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky. 1986) (Baby-selling prohibition "is 
intended to keep baby brokers from overwhelming an expectant mother or the 
parents of a child with financial inducements."). 
See Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L.  REV. 59, 60, 
71-72 (1987); Charney, The Rebirth of Private Adoptions, 71 A.B.A. J .  52, 54 (1985); 
Note, supra note 55, at 637-38. 
116. See In re Baby Girl D ,  512 Pa. 449, 454, 517 A.2d 925, 927 (1986) 
("[Tlhe limitation upon expenses ensures that children are not bought and sold 
like commodities."); Adoption of Anonymous, 286 A.D. 161, 166, 143 N.Y.S.2d 
90, 95 (1955) ("A child is not a chattel to be bought or sold."); Goodman v. 
District of Columbia, 50 A.2d 812, 813 (1947). 
117. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 11A (West Supp. 1988). 
118. I d .  
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intermediaries must refrain from baby-selling. The collection of any 
prohibited fee by them violates state baby-selling provisions. Such 
a fee converts a permissible gray-market adoption into a black-market 
placement.llg Thus, no state adoption statute permits a fee to be 
paid an intermediary in exchange for placing a child. 
3.  The Requirement of an Investigation 
In most adoptions, the biological parents do not know the iden- 
tity of the adoptive parents120 so they have no way to investigate 
their fitness. Even in an open adoption, when the biological parents 
know or even select the adoptive parents,121 the state requires an 
investigation into their fitnesslZ2 and thereby assumes ultimate re- 
sponsibility for ensuring that the adoptive parents are fit and that 
the child's welfare is protected. Such an investigation entails a com- 
plete check of the potential adoptive parents' ability to care for a 
child, including their psychological, sociological, physical, and fi- 
nancial ability to provide a proper home.123 By conducting a 
119. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
120. See, e . g . ,  Barwin v. Reidy, 62 N.M. 183, 307 P.2d 175 (1957). Such 
adoptions are referred to as "closed" adoptions. When the biological parents are 
informed of the adoptive parents' identity, the adoption is an "open" adoption. 
121. T h e  biological parent may be permitted to select the adoptive home in 
which he o r  she wishes to place the child. See, e . g . ,  COLO. REV. STAT. $ 19-5-206 
(Supp. 1987). The  state, however, retains the right to investigate the adoptive 
parents so selected. Id. Thus,  even where the biological parents choose the adoptive 
parents for their child, the state has the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the 
fitness of the adoptive parents, and if the couple selected by the biological parents 
is found to be unfit, the child will not be placed with them. 
122. See, e . g . ,  ALA. CODE $ 26-10-2 (1986) ("[I]t shall be the duty of the . . . 
depar tment  . . . to  make a thorough invest igation . . . ."); ALASKA STAT. 
$ 25.23.100 (1983) ("A reasonable investigation shall be made by the depart- 
ment."); ARK. STAT. ANN. $ 9-9-212 (1987) ("Upon the filing of a petition for 
adoption, the court shall order a n  investigation."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. $ 45- 
61f (Supp. 1988) ("The court may, and in any contested cases shall, request . . . 
an investigation . . . ."). See also ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 63, at  74-85; 
infra notes 125- 128 and accompanying text. 
123. See, for example, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 8-105 (Supp. 1987), which 
provides in pertinent part: 
This investigation . . . shall consider all relevant and material facts 
dealing with the prospective adoptive parents' fitness to adopt children, 
and shall include but is not limited to: 
1. A complete social history. 
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comprehensive investigation of the prospective adoptive parents, the 
state limits those who are permitted to adopt to persons who the 
state believes will act in the child's best interest. 
Some states do not require an investigation when the person 
adopting the child is a stepparent,lZ4 but most either require an 
investigation as they would in an adoption by an unrelated couple125 
or provide that the investigation may be waived when appropriate.lZ6 
2. The financial condition of the applicant. 
3. The moral fitness of the applicant. 
4. The religious background of the applicant. 
5. The physical and mental health condition of the applicants. 
9. All other facts bearing on the issue of the fitness of the prospective 
adoptive parents that the court, agency or division may deem relevant. 
See also MONT. CODE ANN. 5 40-8-122 (1987) (Investigation shall include medical 
and social histories of the adoptive parents along with all other relevant circum- 
stances.); ALA. CODE § 26-10-2 (1986) (A "thorough" investigation must be made - 
including an investigation of the moral, physical and financial fitness of the proposed 
adoptive parents.). 
124. See, e . g . ,  ALA. CODE 5 26-10-2 (1986) ("The department . . . is no 
longer required to investigate petitions of stepfathers [or] stepmothers . . . ."); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-105 (Supp. 1987) (Provisions requiring investigation 
"shall not apply . . . where the prospective adoptive parent is the spouse of the 
natural parent of the child."). 
125. See, for example, CAL. CIV. CODE 5 227a (West Supp. 1985), which 
provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, the probation 
officer or, at option of the board of supervisors, the county welfare 
department . . . shall make an investigation of each case of adoption 
by a stepparent where one natural parent retains custody and control 
of the child. No order of adoption shall be made by the court until 
after the probation officer has filed his or her or welfare department 
has filed its report and recommendation and it has been considered by 
the court. 
126. See, e . g . ,  ARK. STAT. ANN. 5 9-9-212 (1987) ("The court may . . . waive 
the requirement for an investigation report when a stepparent is the peti- 
tioner . . . ."); CONN. STAT. ANN. 5 45-63a (Supp. 1988) ("[Iln the case of a child 
sought to be adopted by a stepparent, the court . . . may waive all requirements . . . 
for investigation . . . ."); IDAHO CODE 5 16-1506 (Supp. 1988) ("At the hearing 
the court may deny the application, enter a final decree approving the adoption 
if it is satisfied that the adoption is for the best interests of the child, or order an 
investigation."); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1508 (Supp. 1988) (An "investi- 
gation shall not be made when the petition seeks to adopt a related child . . . 
unless the court, in its discretion, shall so order."); Mo.  ANN. STAT. 5 453.070 
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The rationale for making the investigation discretionary in these 
circumstances is presumably that a full investigation is not required 
in order to protect the child's best interest in every case of a step- 
parent adoption. For example, in a case involving the death of one 
of the child's natural parents, the state may wish to retain the 
flexibility of dispensing with a full investigation when the remaining 
spouse, who has sole custody of the child, remarries. The state could 
not and would not want to prevent the remaining parent from 
remarrying.I2' Therefore, since the stepparent would be present in 
the home, the only issue would be his or her legal relationship to 
the child. More often than not, it would be more beneficial for the 
child to be legally adopted than for the stepparent to forego the 
adoption. Thus, in a stepparent adoption, there may be factors other 
than the child's best interest - keeping the child with at least one 
biological parent and fostering the marriage relationship - at issue.128 
It is important to remember, though, that most states provide some 
mechanism for investigation, even of stepparents, which can be utilized 
when necessary. 
The foregoing policies reflected in the adoption process are 
designed to protect all parties involved. By requiring that the bio- 
logical parents give informed consent they are protected from im- 
proper termination of their parental rights. The adoptive parents 
are also protected by the consent provision because valid consent 
ensures the child's availability for adoption. The prohibition of baby- 
selling protects the child from being placed based on improper criteria 
which might totally ignore the child's best interests. Finally, the 
investigation of the adoptive parents is the state method of ensuring 
that they are fit to raise a child. With these policies established, a 
(Vernon 1986) (Investigation may be waived where one of the petitioners is the 
natural parent of the child.); N .M.  STAT. ANN. § 40-7-46 (1985); N.D. CENT. 
5 14-15-1 1 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-10 (1984) (investigation of 
stepparent discretionary); WIS. STAT. ANN. 48.88 (West 1987) (limited investi- 
gation of stepparent). The fact that the investigation may be waived does not 
necessarily mean that the stepparent will be permitted to adopt the child. The 
court may still determine that the adoption is not in the child's best interest or 
order an investigation to make that determination. 
127. For a discussion of the public policy favoring the marriage relationship, 
see supra note 40. 
128. But see In re R . H . N . ,  710 P.2d 482 (Colo. 1985) (best interests of child 
governs even in a stepparent adoption). 
Heinonline - -  20 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 33 1988-1989 
34 COL UMBZA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20: 1 
determination must be made of their compatibility with surrogate 
parenting agreements. 
A. Absence of Voluntary, Informed Consent 
Surrogate parenting agreements impair the ability of the sur- 
rogate to give voluntary informed consent in two respects. First, 
requiring the surrogate to consent to the surrender of the child before 
conception deprives her of informed consent. Second, the fee she 
receives in exchange for that consent renders the consent involuntary. 
Either factor is sufficient in itself to vitiate the surrogate's consent. 
Requiring the surrogate to consent to the termination of her 
parental rights not only prior to the birth of the child, but also prior 
to conception is clearly incompatible with state adoption laws which 
require that consent be given only after birth. The laws prohibiting 
pre-birth consent are designed to ensure that the biological mother 
is not forced to make a hasty or ill-considered decision.lZ9 The 
surrogate agrees not only to act as a surrogate and to bear a child, 
but also to surrender that child. The final consent by the surrogate 
to surrender the child is hastened because it is given before conception 
and before the child is born. This practice ignores the psychological 
and emotional aspects of pregnancy and childbirth and puts the 
surrogate in an equally if not more difficult situation than a biological 
mother facing a traditional adoption decision.130 Regardless of the 
129. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. 
130. Of course, a woman's consent to become a surrogate and to surrender 
the child to the biological father at  birth is arguably quite different from the consent 
of an expectant mother to surrender her child for adoption. The  concern about a 
woman making a hasty decision is theoretically minimized in the surrogate context. 
In the adoption context, the woman is already pregnant and a decision must be 
made, within a relatively short period of time, as to who will raise the child. In 
a surrogate parenting situation, the biological mother is not pregnant at  the time 
consent is given. The surrogate simply decides that she will bear a child for the 
adopting couple. There is no sense of urgency as might be experienced by one 
who is already pregnant. Moreover, the decision to become a surrogate may evolve 
over a prolonged period of time. As the one recent report explains, however: 
[slome commentators suggest that surrogacy poses less risk to women 
than the surrender of a child for adoption in other circumstances because 
a surrogate becomes pregnant with the intention of giving the child 
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amount of time the surrogate has to consider her decision prior to 
signing the surrogate parenting agreement, she cannot accurately 
anticipate whether she will in fact be willing to give the child up 
for adoption once he or she is born.l3I A bonding process occurs 
between mother and child during pregnancy which the current sur- 
rogate parenting process ignores.132 The surrogate is asked to consent 
to the surrender of the child before such bonding occurs and before 
she has an opportunity to know how the pregnancy will affect her 
emotionally.Is3 By being forced to make this emotion-laden decision 
in an untimely fashion, the surrogate is deprived of her right to 
informed consent. 
In Surrogate Parenting Associates v. Commonwealth ex rel. Arrn~trong,'~~ 
the Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that a surrogate who 
consented to surrender the child to the biological father prior to the 
child's birth had the right to change her mind. The court concluded 
that the surrogate parenting agreement was voidable because the 
timing of the surrogate's consent was inappropriate based upon the 
Kentucky adoption laws. As the court explained: 
away. However, it is also possible that the risk is aggravated for sur- . 
rogates, many of whom have been found to be emotionally or psycho- 
logically vulnerable before entering the surrogacy contract. For example, 
one study of potential surrogates revealed that one-third felt they were 
' I  atoning" for an abortion or  for a previous child relinquished for 
adoption. Another study of 30 women who had babies as surrogates 
found that all the women experienced some degree of grief. T e n  percent 
were so distraught after relinquishing the infant that they sought ther- 
apeutic counseling. 
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3 ,  at 24-25. 
131. See supra note 98 and accompanying text; infra note 137-139. 
132. See Gaffney, supra note 88, at  91-95 (discussing maternal-fetal bonding 
process). 
133. In some instances the organization arranging the surrogate agreement 
prefers to use surrogates who already have other children. TASK FORCE REPORT, 
supra note 3, at  25 ("Surrogates generally have from one to three living children 
(a requirement for acceptance at  some parenting clinics). . . ."). T h e  fear may be 
that a woman who has never had a child cannot know how she will be affected 
by the birth of the baby and is more likely to decide to try to keep it. O n  the 
other hand,  one surrogate organization, Surrogate Parenting Associates, has stated 
that the reason for using only surrogates who already have children is that their 
fertility has been established. Telephone interview with Loretta Bradshaw, Sur- 
rogate Parenting Associations (Mar. 2, 1989). 
134. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986). 
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The surrogate mother's consent given before five days fol- 
lowing birth of the baby is no more legally binding than 
the decision of an unwed mother during her pregnancy that 
she will put her baby up for adoption. The five days' consent 
feature . . . in the consent to adoption statute (KRS 
199.500(5)) take[s] precedence over the parties' contractual 
commitments, meaning that the surrogate mother is free to 
change her mind.'35 
The court in Surrogate Parenting Associates, and the Kentucky 
legislature which provided the five days' consent feature, were un- 
doubtedly sensitive to the psychological aspects of pregnancy and 
childbirth. Mental health professionals who understand the bonding 
process that occurs during pregnancy recognize that a surrogate's 
decision to surrender a child may be extremely difficult to honor 
once the child is born.'36 Accordingly, at least one mental health 
expert has suggested that a woman be required to undergo a psy- 
chiatric evaluation before being permitted to become a surrogate and 
that such an evaluation must specifically include detailed discussions 
about the surrogate's "potential for changing her mind about relin- 
quishing the baby after delivery and keeping the newborn."137 The 
author, a psychiatrist, asks "[hlow well can a surrogate mother 
applicant understand and comprehend, prior to the artificial insem- 
ination, how she will feel when she relinquishes the Good 
135. Id .  at  212-213. The court did not, however, hold that surrogate parenting 
agreements violate public policy, concluding instead that such a decision was for 
the legislature to make. The court explained: 
[Tlhe threshold question is whether the legislation on the books declares 
the procedure impermissible. Short of such legislation it is not for the 
courts to cut off solutions offered by science. . . . We have consistently 
held that our Kentucky Constitution empowers the legislative branch, 
but not the judicial branch, of government to articulate public policy 
regarding health and welfare. 
Id .  at  213. 
136. See Parker, Surrogate Motherhood, supra note 8 ,  at 24. 
137 .  Id .  at 24-26. 
138. Id .  at  27. The author concludes that there is insufficient data to answer 
this question. H e  notes that "further research needs to be done on the adequacy 
of the various techniques to help assure the informed nature of the consent for 
the psychological issues." Id.  See also Burt, Judicial Enforcement Seen Inappropriate, 
119 N.J .L .J .  328 (1987) ("How can a court order a pregnant woman not to form 
an emotional bonding, a 'parent-child relationship' with the baby in her womb?"). 
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psychiatric or  psychological counseling is not a perfect determinant 
of which women will have difficulty surrendering the child.'39 The 
medical profession recognizes the psychological difficulty, if not im- 
possibility, of giving voluntary, informed consent prior to birth. The 
adoption laws are evidence that the legal community also recognizes 
this difficulty; many states mandate that consent be given after 
birth.I4O Thus,  the legal community, through traditional adoption 
laws, recognizes the emotional aspects of pregnancy and childbirth 
and incorporates measures designed to deal with this.I4l The  modern 
"surrogate adoption," however, fails to recognize that a woman, 
even one who has given birth in the past, may not be able to predict 
her emotional state when the child she has agreed to surrender is 
born pursuant to the surrogate parenting agreement. A surrogate's 
consent should be deemed invalid if she makes this decision prior 
to the birth of the ~ h i 1 d . l ~ ~  Not only should the surrogate parenting 
agreement be voidable based on this factor alone, but the surrogate 
should be informed after the child's birth that she has the right to 
139. But see Parker, Surrogate Motherhood, supra note 8 ,  at 27. Parker implies 
that with adequate psychiatric counseling, few women who pass the psychological 
screening will change their mind. H e  concedes, however, that there is insufficient 
data with which to make a conclusive determination on this point. 
140. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
141. See, e . g . ,  Hendrix v. Hunter, 99 Ga .  App. 785, 796, 110 S.E.2d 35, 
40 (1959) (Although court found consent was valid where mother of illegitimate 
child signed adoption consents both before and after the birth of the child, the 
court acknowledged that child "welfare agencies prefer that the mothers of ille- 
gitimate children see their offspring before consenting to adoption."). 
142. "Under the contract, the natural mother is irrevocably committed before 
she knows the strength of her bond with her child. She never makes a totally 
voluntary, informed decision, for quite clearly any decision prior to the baby's 
birth is, in the most important sense, uninformed . . . ." In re Baby M ,  109 N.J. 
396, 437, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (1988). 
See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at  124 ("Many of the [New York State] 
Task Force members support the nonenforceability of surrogate contracts, in part 
because they believe that it is not possible for women to give informed consent to 
the surrender of a child prior to the child's conception and birth. Some commen- 
tators have argued that this conclusion diminishes women's stature as autonomous 
adults. T h e  Task Force members reject that assertion."). 
See also Wolf, supra note 9, at  400 ("A parent can be unexpectedly smitten 
with profound connection to the newborn child at birth, and a parent who tries 
(for whatever reason) to give a child away, can find it impossible to go through 
with the parting. "). 
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void the contract. Without this information being expressly provided 
to her, the surrogate is unlikely to believe that she has the freedom 
to renege on her agreement.143 In turn, even her continued acqui- 
escence after the baby's birth may not be considered inf01-rned.I~~ 
Surrogate parenting agreements, by ignoring the fact that bonding 
occurs during pregnancy, are voidable for want of informed consent 
on the part of the surrogate. 
The foregoing issues involving informed consent are analogous 
to the tort doctrine of informed consent which involves consent to 
143. Approximately 60% of the women in Parker's study were working o r  
had a working spouse. Although 26% had taken some college courses only one 
had a bachelor's degree. Parker, Motivation, supra note 8 ,  at  117. In Baby M, Mary 
Beth Whitehead, the surrogate, left high school at age 15 while in the middle of 
the tenth grade. 217 N.J. Super. 313, 338, 525 A.2d 1128, 1140 (Super. Ct .  App. 
Div. 1987). It  therefore appears that the typical surrogate has no legal training. 
Moreover, she may not be financially able to gain easy access to legal counsel. 
While the organization may arrange for legal counsel to be provided to the surrogate, 
it is questionable whether the legal counsel she receives will be unbiased. At 
Surrogate Parenting Associates (SPA), for example, the following description has 
been given of the legal counsel that the surrogate receives: 
The [surrogate] . . . sees a n  attorney at the clinic. SPA recommends 
the same attorneys regularly because of their familiarity with the agree- 
ments. This continuing relationship between the attorney and the com- 
pany raises ethical questions about the representation of the surrogate 
mother during contract negotiations. Since the company has an interest 
in keeping the surrogate's fee as low as possible and thus increasing 
its volume of business, an attorney with ties to the company may have 
a conflict of interest. In  one account, a woman requested to see a private 
attorney. The  company recommended against this, and suggested a 
lawyer often used by other surrogate mothers. This attorney explained 
the contract to the prospective mother within earshot of a company 
official who recorded all the questions she asked. 
Note, An Incomplete Picture, supra note 7, at 239-40. 
The  lack of adequate counselling has been deemed sufficient to vitiate consent 
in a traditional adoption case. See In re Adoption of Anonymous, 60 Misc. 2d 854, 
304 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1969). In  Anonymous, the 13 year-old biological mother received 
no legal advice and was informed that the private placement adoption was tem- 
porary. While Anonymous is a rather extreme case, it illustrates that lack of adequate 
counselling can, under appropriate circumstances, vitiate consent. 
144. See, e . g . ,  Baby M ,  109 N . J .  at 437, 537 A.2d at  1248 ("[Alny decision 
after [the baby's birth] compelled by a pre-existing contractual commitment, the 
threat of a lawsuit, and the inducement of a $10,000 payment, is less than totally 
voluntary. "). 
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medical treatment.145 Under the doctrine of informed consent, an  
individual who receives medical treatment has a right to be informed 
of all the material risks involved with the p r 0 ~ e d u r e . l ~ ~  As one court 
has described it, "a physician violates his duty to his patient and 
subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are nec- 
essary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient."I4' 
"Any" facts includes the fact that a given procedure involves certain 
psychological as well as physical risks. Thus,  informed consent entails 
ensuring that the patient "understand[s] the risk of undesirable 
 consequence^"'^^ - both physical and psychological.149 Because 
145. The surrogate parenting agreement requires the surrogate to undergo 
the medical procedure of artificial insemination, a procedure for which informed 
consent is required. F. ROSOVSKY, supra note 83, at 158 ("A.I.D. [artificial in- 
semination by donor] is a medical intervention or intrusion into another person's 
body [that] cannot be overlooked: it triggers the need for fully informed consent."). 
In addition to the issue of informed consent, artificial insemination creates potential 
legal problems in terms of the legitimacy of the child born pursuant thereto and 
who is perceived as the legal father of the child. Id .  In  Connecticut, for example, 
"[alny child or children born as a result of A.I.D. shall be deemed to acquire, 
in all respects, the status of a naturally conceived legitimate child of the husband 
and wife who consented to and requested the use of A.I.D." CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 45-69.i (1980). In states with similar provisions, the child born pursuant to the 
surrogate agreement will be considered the legitimate child of the surrogate and 
her husband, rather than the legal child of the biological father. In  order to 
circumvent provisions of this sort, the husband of the surrogate may expressly 
refuse to consent to the artificial insemination. See MBW Contract, supra note 9, 
at Exhibit G ,  in which Richard Whitehead, the surrogate's husband states: "I, 
RICHARD WHITEHEAD, husband of MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, . . . ex- 
pressly withhold and refuse to consent to any artificial insemination in connection 
with the surrogate parenting procedures proposed by my wife. I recognize that by 
refusing to consent to the insemination, I cannot be declared or considered to be 
the legal father of said child conceived thereby." 
146. See PROSSER A N D  KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS  32, at 189-91 (5th 
ed. 1984); Plant, An Analysis of Informed Consent, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 639 (1968). 
147. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 
560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957). In the surrogate parenting context, an issue 
might arise as to who has the duty to ensure that the surrogate receives informed 
consent. The physician who performs the insemination may be unaware that it is 
for the purpose of conceiving a child pursuant to a surrogate parenting agreement. 
Arguably, then, there should be a shared responsibility between the physician who 
performs the insemination and the organization that brings the contracting parties 
together to ensure that the surrogate's right to informed consent is satisfied. 
148. PROSSER A N D  KEETON, supra note 146, § 18, at 120. 
149. See supra note 147. The consequences of the treatment of artificial in- 
semination include pregnancy and the risks associated with it and childbearing. 
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informed consent requires that the patient be informed of and un- 
derstand the material risks associated with a particular treatment, 
informed consent is a "process" rather than a simple "form" that 
the patient must sign.I5O This process involves an exchange of infor- 
mation between the doctor and patient. In the case of surrogate 
parenting, the requisite interchange should involve more than a simple 
question of whether the patient understands the risks and her affir- 
mative or negative response. The surrogate should be required to 
explain to the satisfaction of the doctor that she in fact understands 
the risks. Even then, she should be permitted to give final consent 
to the termination of her parental rights only after the child is born. 
Under the doctrine of informed consent, the issue generally is 
not whether the patient has consented to a particular treatment.l5I 
Normally the patient has consented to the treatment, but later claims 
that he or she was not informed of the material risks associated with 
that treatment. A successful claim that informed consent was lacking 
requires the patient to show that she (1) was not informed of the 
material risks,152 (2) was injured, and (3) would not have consented 
150. F. ROSOVSKY, supra note 83, at  2-3 ("Many people think of consent to 
treatment as a form. Consent is equated in their minds with the document through 
which patients agree to [medical] procedures . . . . Such a definition is incorrect 
and misleading. . . . Consent is a process, not a form. . . . [Clonsent is the dialogue 
between the patient and the provider of services in which both parties exchange 
information. "). 
151. If the patient has not consented to the treatment at all, the doctor may 
be liable for assault and battery. See, e . g . ,  Mohr v .  Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 
N.W. 12 (1905). In the typical case of informed consent, however, the patient 
consents to the treatment, but later claims that he or she was unaware of certain 
material risks associated with the treatment. In this situation, the patient's claim 
against the doctor would normally be based on negligence. See, e . g . ,  Canterbury 
v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.  1064 (1973). 
There  are, however, some jurisdictions which continue to base even the latter type 
of consent case on assault and battery. See, e . g . ,  Spikes v .  Heath,  332 S.E.2d 889 
(Ga. Ct.  App. 1985); Pugsley v. Privette, 220 Va. 892, 263 S.E.2d 69 (1980). 
152. With respect to the adequacy of the information conveyed to the patient, 
two different standards are used in this country. T h e  first standard requires the 
physician to disclose risks that are customarily disclosed in the community. See, 
e . g . ,  Rush v. Miller, 648 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir. 1981); Fuller v. Starnes, 268 Ark. 
476, 597 S.W.2d 88 (1980). The second standard requires the physician to disclose 
the material risks which a reasonable person in the patient's position would want 
to know. See, e . g . ,  Price v. Hurt ,  71 1 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. C t .  App. 1986); Logan 
v. Greenwich Hospital Ass'n, 191 Conn. 282, 465 A.2d 294 (1983); Wheeldon v. 
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to the treatment had she been informed of the material risks.Is3 
Even assuming that a legitimate attempt is made to advise the 
surrogate of the risks involved in the procedure, the informed consent 
doctrine raises two issues in the surrogate context. The first issue 
is whether consent can justifiably be sought; the second is whether 
it is possible for a surrogate to understand, prior to conception, the 
psychological risks she is taking. In the area of human experimen- 
tation, it is acknowledged that, before consent is sought, a deter- 
mination should be made that the procedure itself is justifiable and 
probably in the patient's interest. For example, one commentator 
has questioned the justification for seeking consent from patients for 
an artificial heart.Is4 He suggests that if the procedure is not justifiable 
or the probability is that it is not in the patient's interest, the patient's 
consent to the treatment should not be s 0 ~ g h t . l ~ ~  There are un- 
doubtedly significant differences between the life and death decision 
involved when a patient must decide whether or  not to receive an 
Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367, 374 (S.D. 1985). The trend is to use the second 
standard. F. R o s o v s ~ y ,  supra note 83, at  42. 
153. F. R o s o v s ~ ~ ,  supra note 83, at  7. See also Harnish v .  Children's Hospital 
Medical Center, 387 Mass. 152, 439 N.E.2d 240 (1982); Woolley v. Henderson, 
418 A.2d 1123 (Me. 1980); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 
(1972). 
154. See Annas, Death and the Magic Machine: Informed Consent to the Artificial 
Heart, 9 WEST. NEW ENC. L. REV. 89, 90 (1987) ("Prior to the conversation 
[involving possible risks] and offer of an experimental intervention, an independent 
judgment must be made that the proposed therapy . . . is a reasonable medical 
experiment from both a scientific and public policy perspective. This is necessary 
to protect the patient's welfare; to prevent patients from being demeaned and 
dehumanized by accepting offers they are in no position to refuse.") (emphasis in 
original). 
155. The concern in the context of experimental medical procedures is that 
the physicians involved may want to do the procedure in order to enhance their 
own knowledge rather than to further the patient's interest. Id .  at  92 ("[The 
physician] seemed unaware o f .  . . his own conflict of interest between wanting to 
perform the world's second human heart transplant for himself, and attempting 
to convince [the patient] that the operation was in [the patient's] best interests."). 
In a surrogate arrangement, the threat of the patient's interests being subordinated 
to the interests of the other parties is much greater. The  surrogate agreement does 
not purport to be an agreement designed to benefit the surrogate, except financially. 
The procedure is clearly designed to benefit the adopting couple and the organi- 
zation that brings the parties together for a fee. Thus,  even greater safeguards 
need to be implemented to ensure that the surrogate is given as much information 
about the procedure as possible. 
Heinonline - -  20 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 41 1988-1989 
COLUMBIAHUMANRZGHTSLAWREVZEW [Vol. 20:l 
artificial heart and a surrogate's decision to become impregnated by 
artificial insemination and to surrender the child born pursuant 
thereto to the adopting couple at birth. While artificial insemination 
may no longer be considered physical human experimentation, sur- 
rogate parenting may be considered psychological human experi- 
m e n t a t i ~ n . ' ~ ~  Thus, it is essential that the surrogate be fully informed 
of the risks she is undertaking. 
The surrogate may be less likely, however, to receive adequate 
counselling and information than the patient undergoing physical 
human experimentation such as the implantation of an artificial heart. 
The doctor who implants an artificial heart hopes that the patient's 
health will improve. The overall purpose is to advance medical 
techniques in order to prolong life. The participants in a surrogate 
agreement, however, are not primarily, or even secondarily, con- 
cerned with the surrogate's welfare. The adopting couple is primarily 
concerned with obtaining a baby. The organization which brings the 
parties together is a business enterprise which is interested primarily 
in making a profit.15' Accordingly, an extra effort must be made to 
156. "Experiment" has been defined as  "[tlhe process of testing," BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 519 (5th ed.  1979), o r  as "any action o r  process designed to 
find out whether something is effective, workable [or] valid," WEBSTER'S NEW 
WORLD DICTIONARY 493 (2d Coll. Ed.  1984). It  has also been defined as "any 
action o r  process undertaken to discover something not yet known." Id. Surrogate 
transactions arguably involve a process designed to discover whether women are 
generally capable, emotionally and psychologically, of giving consent prior to 
conception to surrender their child to another couple and terminate their parental 
rights. 
157. At Surrogate Parenting Associates (SPA), the Kentucky organization 
which facilitates surrogate transactions, "a couple receives the benefits of SPA'S 
screening, matchmaking, and medical services . . . [flor a fee that generally starts 
at $25,000." Note, An Incomplete Picture, supra note 7, at 237. SPA does, however, 
provide for some psychological screening of the surrogate: 
[Tlhe prospective mother . . . travels to [SPA] for a two-day visit. 
During her stay, she undergoes psychiatric interviews and a battery of 
intelligence and basic personality tests. This testing is designed to an- 
alyze the surrogate mother's ability to surrender her child after delivery, 
and to reveal the personality disorders or  low intelligence. 
Id. at 239. 
While the counselling mechanism has been established, it is not clear that the 
counselling is adequate. "In one firsthand account, the interview with the psy- 
chologist [at SPA] involved only basic questions and inquiries about future plans. 
The intelligence test was omitted, since the woman was 'obviously bright."' Id.  
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ensure that the surrogate is adequately advised of all the risks of 
artificial insemination, including, in the case of surrogacy, the psy- 
chological risks associated with pregnancy and childbirth. Even when 
the surrogate is so advised, her final consent must be given after 
the birth of the child because it is not possible to understand, prior 
to conception, the psychological risks she is taking.158 
The consent of the surrogate to surrender the child is also invalid 
because the surrogate parenting scheme contemplates that a fee over 
and above actual medical and/or legal expenses will be paid by the 
adopting couple to the surrogate. Surrogates have proffered a variety 
of reasons for their decisions to agree to surrogacy. Some assert that 
their main objective is to give the gift of life to another c0up1e.l~~ 
Others acknowledge that they acted as surrogates because of the 
financial incentive.I6O Whatever their professed reasons, it is generally 
agreed that if there were no fee paid to surrogates, the practice 
would all but disappear.I6l Thus, although very few studies have 
been conducted on the motivations of women who agree to act as 
surrogates, the information that is available suggests that they are, 
to a significant degree, financially needy162 and that the financial 
incentive for entering into a surrogate parenting agreement is a 
strong one. This financial incentive may be sufficient to induce a 
woman to enter into the surrogacy agreement - an agreement she 
probably would not otherwise make, and one that she may later 
regret. The surrogate's fee particularly threatens the voluntariness 
of consent of a surrogate in dire financial straits.163 
158. See supra notes 130-138 and accompanying text. 
159. Parker, Motivation, supra note 8 ,  at 117-18. 
160. Id .  (study on the motivations of 125 women who applied to become 
surrogates found that 89% of 122 women would not participate unless they received 
a fee of at least $5,000). See also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 25. 
161. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3 ,  at 25. 
162. In Baby M ,  for example, the Whiteheads filed for bankruptcy in or 
about 1983. 217 N.J. Super. 313, 339, 525 A.2d 1128, 1140 (Super. Ct.  App. 
Div. 1987). In addition, they had been in default on both of the two mortgages 
on their home and were at one time faced with foreclosure proceedings. Id. at 
340, 525 A.2d at 1140. See also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 25 ("Surrogates 
generally . . . are of modest or moderate financial means. One study found that 
over 60% worked outside the home or had husbands who worked while 40% were 
unemployed or received some sort of financial assistance or both. The annual 
incomes of surrogates ranged from $6,000 to $55,000."). 
163. See, c . Q . ,  Baby M ,  109 N.J. at 425, 537 A.2d at 1241 ("[Tlhe monetary 
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While the fee received by the surrogate - typically between 
$10,000 and $30,000 - is not enough to make the surrogate rich, 
it is sufficient to vitiate consent. Courts have held that much lower 
financial incentives vitiated the biological parents' consent to an 
adoption.I6* In Barwin v. Reidy, consent was vitiated when the adop- 
tive parents paid the biological parents $400 for two children in 
exchange for the biological parents' consent to the ad0pt i0n . l~~  The 
court in Barwin so held despite finding that both the biological parents 
and the adoptive parents were acting out of concern for the children's 
welfare.16'j If relatively small sums can vitiate the consent of the 
biological parents' consent to adoption, a fortiori $10,000 should 
vitiate the surrogate's consent."j7 
B. Violation of Baby Selling Prohibitions 
Despite the states' well-defined public policy against baby selling, 
it has been argued that surrogate parenting agreements are legitimate. 
incentive to sell her child may, depending on her financial circumstances, make 
her decision less voluntary."). In a study on the motivations of 125 women who 
applied to become surrogates, 40% of the first 50 applicants were unemployed or  
receiving some sort of financial assistance. Parker, Motivation, supra note 8 ,  at 117. 
164. In Downs v. Wortman, 185 S.E.2d 387, 228 Ga. 315 (1971), for example, 
the court held that an offer to pay airfare for the biological mother to travel between 
Georgia and Illinois vitiated consent. 
165. 62 N.M.  183, 196, 307 P.2d 175, 184 (1957). The  $400 payment was 
not to reimburse the biological parents for medical or  other legitimate expenses. 
166. Id.  at 195, 307 P.2d at  183. Cf. Hendrix v. Hunter,  110 S.E.2d 35, 
41, 99 Ga .  App. 785, 793 (1959) (Felton, C.J.,  dissenting) ("Monetary consid- 
eration to a mother, or  its equivalent, which forms the basis of an  adoption contract, 
vitiates the agreement."). Cases which conclude that payment to the biological 
mother does not vitiate consent involve payments to cover medical and legal fees 
or  other legitimate expenses. See, e.g., Gorden v. Cutler, 324 Pa. Super. 35, 471 
A.2d 449 (1983); Cohen v. Janic, 57 Ill. App. 2d 309, 207 N.E.2d 89 (1965). 
167. Arguably no parent would give his or her child up for adoption if they 
could afford to care for it, even in a traditional adoption. Barwin, 62 N.M. at 
198, 307 P.2d at  185. Thus ,  even in a non-surrogate adoption, the adoptive parents 
are likely to be wealthier than the biological parents. Therefore, the restrictions 
on payments to the biological parents should be strictly enforced to ensure that a 
biological parent in dire financial straits is not induced to give his or  her child 
up for adoption based on some financial incentive. Of course, parents may give 
children up for adoption for reasons independent of money. For example, teenage 
mothers who conclude that they would rather not be burdened with the responsibility 
of child rearing at a young age may place their children for adoption regardless 
of their financial status. 
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One argument advanced is that the adopting couple is not buying 
a baby, but is paying the surrogate for her services.'G8 Another 
argument is that the evil that the baby-selling statutes were enacted 
to prevent does not exist in surrogate arrangements.IG9 Neither ar- 
gument is compelling. 
The argument that the payment made to the surrogate is for 
her services rather than for the right to adopt the child places form 
over s u b ~ t a n c e . " ~  While the surrogate parenting agreement may state 
that the fee is for the surrogate's services, such a statement is not 
supported by the facts. An examination of the fee structure of a 
typical surrogate parenting agreement reveals that the fee paid to 
the surrogate is not just for the surrogate's services, but rather is a 
fee for the purchase of the baby itself. In the typical surrogate 
parenting agreement, the surrogate's fee ranges from $10,000 to 
168. Keane, supra note 7, at  152-59. 
169. Id. at 154. See also Katz, supra note 4. A third consideration is whctl~cr 
the biological father, who is genetically related to the child, can be said to li,t\.c* 
purchased his own child. One commentator concludes that the Thirteenth Amentl- 
ment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits slavery and thus the salt. 
and purchase of human beings, also prohibits surrogacy. Means, supra note 1 ,  211 
478-79. "A modern father . . . has, by virtue of his paternity, his own parental 
rights to the child. What he does not have is the mother's parental rights. Salt. 
of her parental rights is the equivalent of sale of the child." Id. at  449 n.18. C'. 
Hawkins v. Frye, 1988 W L  59841 (Del. Fam. Ct .  May 25, 1988) (West). There 
a divorcing couple contractually agreed to terminate the father's parental rights. 
The  court, finding that this provision violated public policy, explained: 
Although this case does not involve a parent receiving money for placing 
his child for adoption as did [Baby MI,  it does involve terminating one's 
parental rights, the effect of which would be to avoid paying child 
support. This smacks of the same forbidden motivation: giving up a 
child for monetary benefit. 
Id. at 6. 
If the surrogate were a gestational surrogate only, gestating a fetus created 
by the adopting couple, a question would arise regarding who would be considered 
the biological mother of the child, and thus, whether the biological father would 
still be purchasing the biological mother's parental rights. See supra note 5 .  
170. Compare In re Baby M ,  109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988) (surrogate 
parenting constitutes private placement adoption) with MBW Contract, supra note 
9, at 2, which states that the fee is "compensation for services and expenses, and 
in no way is to be construed as a fee for termination of parental rights or a 
payment in exchange for consent to surrender a child for adoption." (This portion 
of the contract is reprinted in 109 N.J. at 471, 537 A.2d at 1266.) Of course, 
stating this as a proposition does not make it so. 
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$30,000 plus medical and legal expenses.I7l This fee is normally held 
in escrow until the surrogate releases the child to the adopting couple. 
If the surrogate fails to deliver the child, the fee is reduced. In Baby 
M, for example, the contract entered into by Mary Beth Whitehead 
provided that she was to receive a $10,000 fee. If she failed to 
surrender the child, however, she was only entitled to receive $1,000 
at most. If she miscarried prior to the fifth month, she would receive 
no compensation aside from being reimbursed for her medical ex- 
p e n s e ~ . ' ~ ~  Thus, her fee, and surrogates' fees generally, are vastly 
larger if they deliver a child to the adopting couple than if they fail, 
for whatever reason, to deliver the child. In effect, the surrogate is 
paid a success fee. The success fee to a surrogate is analogous to 
the fee paid a real estate broker upon the closing of a home sale, 
an investment banker upon the closing of a financing or merger, or 
any other broker upon the closing of a transaction. Thus, more 
penetrating analyses recognize that the adopting couple is clearly 
paying the surrogate in order to purchase a ~hi1d.I '~  
A suggestion has nevertheless been made that paying a fee to 
a surrogate is legal since most states permit the payment of money 
in connection with the adoption of a baby, including the payment 
of medical and legal fees, payment of an adoption agency fee, and 
the like.174 But such fees are quite different from a separate fee for 
surrendering a child. Once again, an analogy may be made between 
171. See, e . g . ,  Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., v. Commonwealth ex re f .  
Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky. 1986) (In addition to the surrogate's fee, 
"the [biological] father assumes responsibility for medical, hospital, travel, labora- 
tory and other necessary expenses of the pregnancy. . . . T h e  biological father 
[also] pays the attorneys' fees."). 
172. See MBW Contract, supra note 9,  at  para. 10, reprinted in 109 N.J. at  
472, 537 A.2d at 1267; Baby M, 109 N.J. at 424, 537 A.2d at  1241 ("As for the 
contention that the Sterns are paying only for services and not for an adoption, 
we need note only that they would pay nothing in the event the child died before 
the fourth month of pregnancy, and only $1,000 if the child were stillborn, even 
though the 'services' had been fully rendered."). 
173. See, e . g . ,  Wolf, supra note 9, at 388 ("We need to acknowledge and 
explore the extent to which surrogacy is the payment of money for children . . . .") 
(emphasis in original); Katz, supra note 4, at  22 (distinguishing surrogate parenting 
agreements from baby-brokering in the black market regardless of whether the 
couple "is viewed as paying the surrogate . . . for her services or  as paying for 
the rights to a child"). 
174. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text. 
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a surrogate transaction and the purchase of a home. A purchaser 
of a home normally pays legal fees, title insurance fees and many 
other collateral fees in connection with the purchase. It is undisputed, 
though, that the ultimate aim of the transaction is for the seller to 
sell and the buyer to buy the home. Irrespective of any other expenses 
involved in the transaction, the seller receives the purchase price of 
the home. In a traditional adoption, the permitted payments are not 
generally made to the biological mother in consideration for her 
child. Rather they are made to the lawyer, the hospital, and other 
persons or institutions legitimately entitled to be paid. A payment 
made directly to the biological parents must be for the purpose of 
reimbursing out-of-pocket expenses.175 In the surrogacy context, the 
adopting couple might similarly be permitted to pay such legitimate 
collateral expenses of the surrogate as her medical expenses. These 
expenses are the same as the collateral expenses incurred in a tra- 
ditional adoption, and are analogous to the collateral expenses in- 
curred in connection with the sale of a home. The fee paid to the 
surrogate in excess of her legitimate expenses, however, constitutes 
the price of the child, just as the amount paid by a buyer of a house 
in excess of the collateral expenses is the price of the house. The 
surrogate situation cannot be distinguished from a traditional adop- 
tion with respect to state prohibitions against baby-selling. "It is a 
very short step, legally, from saying that it is acceptable for a woman 
to accept money for the transfer of a child who is purposefully 
conceived to saying that a woman may accept money for a child 
that is accidentally conceived."176 Since a payment is being made 
in exchange for the right to adopt a child, surrogate parenting 
agreements violate the baby-selling statutes. 
Surrogate parenting agreements violate not only the letter but 
also the spirit of baby-selling statutes because their potential effect 
is precisely that which the baby-selling statutes are designed to 
prevent. Baby-selling prohibitions are designed to prevent commer- 
cialization of the adoption process and to prohibit treating children 
as ~ h a t t e 1 . I ~ ~  These laws attempt to ensure that when an adoption 
175. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text. 
176. Pierce, The "Surrogate Parenting" Issue and NCFA's Activities, NAT'L ADOP- 
TION REP. ,  Vo1. XIII, No. 1 ,  Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 1 ,  5 (bi-monthly newsletter from 
National Committee for Adoption.). 
177. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. See also H.R.  2101, 85th Gen. 
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takes place it is based on the child's best interest rather than on the 
profit motive of the black-marketeer.'78 Surrogate parenting agree- 
ments are the antithesis of that p01icy.l'~ 
The evils that baby-selling statutes were designed to prevent are 
present in the surrogacy context in three respects. First, the fee that 
the surrogate receives may induce her to act not in the child's best 
- 
interest but in her own best interest. Second, the biological father 
will not necessarily behave any differently from any other unrelated 
black marketeer. Third, the fee received by the organization ar- 
ranging the surrogate t r a n s a c t i ~ n ' ~ ~  is the organization's primary 
purpose for being. It does not exist to benefit the child. 
While. the few existing surrogate parenting cases are not in 
agreement on whether surrogate parenting is compatible with baby- 
selling  provision^,'^^ the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Baby M 
Assem., 1987 111. (In his proposed bill to prohibit surrogate parenting agreements, 
Representative Granberg recognizes that "any form of commercialization in relation 
to the placement or  adoption of children is immoral and contrary to the State's 
goal of ensuring and protecting the welfare of children."). 
178. Id.  In  Baby M, 109 N.J. at 425, 537 A.2d at  1241, the court expressed 
one of the evils of the baby black market as the selling of a child "without regard 
for whether the purchasers will be suitable parents." 
179. But see Katz, supra note 4, at  52 (The author concludes that the baby- 
selling laws should not prohibit surrogate parenting agreements and explains that 
"these statutes were not enacted with surrogate motherhood in mind and should 
not be used to accomplish a purpose for which they were not designed."). 
180. The  organization charges a fee for finding the parties and for conducting 
other services such as the artificial insemination. See Surrogate Parenting Associates, 
Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky. 1986) (Sur- 
rogate Parenting Associates was "paid a fee by the biological father for selection 
and artificial insemination of the surrogate . . . for obstetrical care and testing 
during pregnancy, and for actual delivery."); Baby M, 109 N.J. at  424, 537 A.2d 
at  1241 ("[Tlhe fee to the Infertility Center ($7,500) was stated to be for legal 
representation, advice, administrative work, and other 'services.' Nevertheless, it 
seems clear that the money was paid and accepted in connection with an adoption. 
The Infertility Center's major role was first as a 'finder' of the surrogate mother 
whose child was to be adopted, and second as the arranger of all proceedings that 
led to the adoption."). Even Noel Keane, a strong advocate of surrogate parenting, 
recognizes that "[alny broker or intermediary who brings the interested parties 
together could . . . act from motives of pecuniary gain." Keane, supra note 168, 
at  156. 
181. Compare Surrogate Parenting Associates, 704 S.W.2d a t  209 (surrogate par- 
enting does not violate baby-selling prohibitions), with Baby M, 109 N.J. at 396, 
537 A.2d at  1227 (surrogate parenting does violate such prohibitions). 
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expressed the best view: "The negative consequences of baby-buying 
are potentially present in the surrogacy context, especially the po- 
tential for placing and adopting a child without regard to the interest 
of the child or the natural mother."lB2 The court reasoned that the 
natural mother's interests are neglected because she is unlikely to 
receive proper counselling.183 The child's best interests are not pro- 
tected because the child will be sold to the party with the financial 
means to pay, regardless of whether that party is a suitable parent.IB4 
Finally, the adoptive parents' interests may not be protected. In 
Baby M, the court felt that the adoptive parents might suffer, for 
example, from not being informed of the medical history of the 
child. 
In a surrogate arrangement, both the biological mother and the 
organization that brings the parties together act as independent child- 
placers. In the traditional adoption context, neither would be per- 
mitted to profit from the placement of a The biological 
mother does profit, though, by collecting a fee of anywhere from 
$10,000 to $30,000 over and above her medical expenses. It may 
be argued that, since the surrogate is the biological mother of the 
child, she is more likely to provide for the child's best interest and 
that the baby-selling statutes were not designed to encompass the 
surrogacy arrangement. In fact, however, the fee paid to the surrogate 
is an important if not the primary motivating force in a woman's 
decision to act as a surrogate.IB7 Thus,  even the biological mother 
in a surrogate arrangement treats the child as chattel at least to 
some extent. The surrogate is likely to work with the couple willing 
to pay her the most money, with the result that the child will likely 
be awarded to the highest bidder. 
Since the adopting coup1elB8 is genetically related to the child 
through the father, an emotional bond, at least, is expected between 
the biological father and the child, which would tend to prevent the 
182. Baby M ,  109 N . J .  at 425, 537 A.2d at 1245. 
183. I d . ,  537 A.2d at 1241. 
184. Id.  
185. Id.  
186. See supra notes 110-119 and accompanying text. 
187. See supra note 160. 
188. In order to circumvent the baby selling statutes, the parties to a surrogate 
parenting agreement are often just the surrogate and the biological father. The 
biological father arguably cannot buy his own child. 
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creation of a black market in baby selling. The genetic tie, however, 
between the father and child does not ensure that the child's best 
interests will be served.189 History demonstrates that such a bond 
does not preclude baby-selling. I t  is well documented that during 
the embarrassing time in this country when slavery was legal, white 
slave masters often raped slave women, creating mulatto babies. 
These slave owners, however, were not concerned with the health 
and welfare of these babies and often sold them as they sold other 
slaves.1g0 Thus the mere existence of a genetic link did not ensure 
that an emotional bond existed or that the father would not be willing 
to sell the child to another individual at the right price. Of course, 
the racial considerations which were present at that time made such 
a practice almost acceptable. Such racial considerations are unlikely 
to be present in the surrogacy context. Other considerations, how- 
ever, could arise which would create the same potential for the 
creation of a black-market. The child could, for example, be born 
with physical and/or mental handicaps. In  such a case, the surrogate 
parenting agreement would normally provide that the adopting couple 
agrees to take legal responsibility for the child.Ig1 The adopting 
couple, however, may not necessarily perform as previously agreed.lg2 
189. In cases of divorce or separation, many biological fathers fail to provide 
for their children's best interests by neglecting to make child support payments. 
See U.S.  Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports series P-23, No. 152, 
indicating that approximately 26% of women entitled to child support in 1985 
failed to receive it. 
190. D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 205 (1987) ("Forced to submit to 
the sexual desires of their masters or of slaves selected by their masters, [black] 
women then suffered the agony of watching helplessly as their children were sold 
off."). 
191. See MBW Contract, supra note 9, at  para. 14, which provides: 
WILLIAM STERN . . . recognizes that some genetic and congenital 
abnormalities may not be detected by amniocentesis or other tests, and 
therefore, if proven to be the biological father of the child, assumes the 
legal responsibility for any child who may possess genetic or congenital 
abnormalities. 
192. In a pending Michigan case, for example, a surrogate gave birth to a 
potentially handicapped child. The alleged biological father refused to take re- 
sponsibility for the child and it was later determined that the actual biological 
father was the surrogate's husband. Jane Doe v. Attorney General, No. 88-819032- 
C Z  (Cir. Ct .  for Wayne County, Mich.). Michigan has subsequently passed leg- 
islation prohibiting surrogate parenting agreements. See Surrogate Parenting Act, 
1988 Mich. Legis. Serv. 420-22 (West) (to be codified at  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
5 722). 
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They may attempt to sell the child on the black market. O r ,  they 
may legally attempt to place the child for adoption with an unrelated 
couple. In such a case, the child is unlikely to be adopted, and is 
most likely to become a ward of the state.Ig3 Thus, a child who is 
born with physical or mental handicaps risks being neglected, aban- 
doned, and/or abused . I g 4  
C.  Lack of an Investigation 
The fee structure used in the surrogate context also fails to 
consider the adopting couple's fitness as parents since their ability 
to pay the surrogate's fee rather than their fitness as parents is the 
most important factor. No investigation whatsoever is required of 
the adopting couple's fitness as parents. This deficiency is also incon- 
sistent with adoption laws. 
Although several states provide that an investigation need not 
be conducted when a stepparent is adopting a child, most provide 
that an investigation will be made if the state, in its discretion, 
deems it necessary to protect the child's best interest.lg5 Thus, the 
state mechanism of adoption is used to ensure that even in an 
adoption by a stepparent the child's best interests are served. More- 
over, in at least one jurisdiction, the provision providing for a 
discretionary investigation in a stepparent adoption,Ig6 has not been 
applied in a surrogate situation. Instead, a full investigation of the 
adoptive stepparent was required.Ig7 
With surrogate arrangements the fitness of the parents is not 
overseen at all. There is no mechanism for ensuring that the wife 
193. There are many handicapped children who are waiting to be adopted. 
See infra notes 217-222 and accompanying text. 
194. T o  some extent, a handicapped child faces such risks even when both 
of the parents are biological parents. T h e  risks of abandonment, neglect, o r  abuse 
are arguably greater, however, in the surrogate context. The  bonding between 
mother and child that occurs during pregnancy and childbirth will not be expe- 
rienced by the adopting couple. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. Where 
both parents are biological parents, at least the biological mother will have ex- 
perienced that bonding process. Thus, she may be less likely to reject a handicapped 
child. 
195. See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text. 
196. D.C. CODE ANN.  § 16-308 (Supp. 1988). 
197. In re R.K.S. ,  112 W . L . R .  1117 (Super. Ct . )  cited in In re R . M . G . ,  454 
A.2d 776 (D.C. C t .  App. 1982). 
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of the biological father is fit. Her fitness as a parent is simply not 
a factor in the equation. There are no safeguards in a surrogate 
parenting arrangement to ensure that the child's best interests are 
served. 
With surrogate parenting, the surrogate and the adopting couple 
select each other. By agreeing to work with a particular couple, it 
is the surrogate who determines who should adopt the child - not 
the state, as is the norm under adoption statutes.Ig8 Moreover, the 
surrogate's decision may not be based on the best interest of the child. 
It may be based purely on financial donsiderations.Ig9 This is not 
compatible with state adoption procedures whereby, even if the bio- 
logical parents indicate their preference regarding who should adopt 
the child, the state has the freedom to disregard the preference if it is 
not in the child's best interest.200 
Surrogate parenting agreements are incompatible with ordinary 
and well thought-out adoption procedures in at least three ways. 
They fail to regard the best interest of the child as the primary goal. 
This deficiency is reflected in the failure to provide for an investi- 
gation of the suitability of the adoptive parent. It is also reflected 
in the fee structure, which violates baby-selling prohibitions. Sur- 
rogate parenting agreements also fail to protect the interests of the 
biological mother because they fail to ensure that her consent to 
surrender the child is voluntary and informed. Because of the failure 
to comply with the adoption laws, the adopting couple is at risk 
because they have no assurance that the transaction is legal.201 
198. Although some states permit the biological parent to place the child, 
an investigation is made to ensure that the prospective adoptive parents are fit. 
See supra notes 12 1-122 and accompanying text. 
199. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
200. Barwin v. Reidy, 62 N.M. 183, 191-92, 307 P.2d 175, 181 (1957) (The 
court "may or may not decree adoption in favor of persons recommended by the 
natural parents." Even where "the natural parents have investigated the quali- 
fications of the petitioners and given them their unqualified approval, the court 
may still refuse to decree adoption, the selection of [an adoptive] parent being a 
judicial act and the responsibility being that of the court."). 
201. Although the public policies set forth in adoption statutes arguably should 
change to reflect advances in reproductive technology, there are certain adoption 
policies which must be retained if the interests of the biological parents, the adoptive 
parents, the child, and, in turn,  society are to be protected. See infra notes 204- 
224  and accompanying text. 
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The fact that surrogate parenting agreements as currently struc- 
tured are incompatible with adoption laws does not necessarily mean 
that no surrogacy contract can ever be enforced. They do, however, 
need to be modified in order to bring them into compliance with 
adoption laws. Moreover, surrogate agreements should be carefully 
regulated by the state. 
IV. POTENTIAL COMPATIBILITY OF SURROGATE PARENTING 
AGREEMENTS WITH STATE ADOPTION LAWS 
A. Minimum Requirements for Consistency With Adoption 
Statutes 
Thirty-four states have proposed bills on the subject of surrogate 
parenting. Michigan has actually enacted legislation.202 Many of the 
bills would, and the Michigan statute does, render surrogate par- 
enting agreements u n e n f o r ~ e a b l e . ~ ~ ~  While this is an acceptable and 
202. Surrogate Parenting Act, supra note 192. The Michigan Act, which took 
effect on Sept. 1, 1988, renders surrogate parenting agreements "void and unen- 
forceable as contrary to public policy." Id. at § 5. The Act encompasses both 
genetic and gestational surrogates (see supra note 5) and prohibits both types of 
arrangements. Id. at § 3(i). The Act makes violations a felony, "punishable by a 
fine of not more than $50,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or 
both." Id. at § 7(2). The Michigan Surrogate Parenting Act was already challeriged 
by the Michigan Civil Liberties Union on constitutional grounds. A settlement 
was reached, however, when the state attorney general agreed to an interpretation 
of the statute which would permit surrogate parenting agreements to be enforced 
as long as the surrogate's final consent to surrender the child is made after birth. 
N.Y. TIMES, ept. 20, 1988, at A15, col. 1. 
203. See, e.g.,  H. 172, 1988 Ala.; A. 3200, 1988 Cal.; S. 358, 1987 Iowa; 
H. 2101, 1987 111.; S. 499, 1987 Ill.; S. 4, 1988 Ky.; S. 1660, 1987 Minn.; H. 
1701, 1988 Minn.; S. 2157, 1988 Miss.; S. 305, 1987 N.C.; H. 751, 1988 N.H.;  
A.  62771s. 4641, 1987 N.Y.; A. 88521s. 6891, 1988 N.Y.; A. 9882, 1988 N.Y.; 
A.  11607, 1988 N.Y.; S. 4640, 1987 N.Y.; S. 386, 1987 R. I . ;  S. 2518, 1988 R. I . ;  
H. 237, 1988 Va.;  A. 554, 1987 Wis. Some bills go so far as to impose criminal 
penalties for violations of the provisions. See S. 281, 1988 N.H. (misdemeanor); 
A. 13, 1988 N.J. (crime of the third degree); Title 18, 4 4305, 1987 Pa.; H. 2030, 
1988 Wash. (gross misdemeanor). See also Surrogate Parenting Act, supra note 192, 
at § 9. 
Other bills would allow surrogate parenting agreements with restrictions. See 
H. 2052, 1988 Iowa (surrogate parenting agreements permitted upon court ap- 
proval); H. 2279, 1988 Iowa (permits surrogate parenting agreements but biological 
. - 
mother must sign release not less than 72 hours following the child's birth); S. 
620, 1988 Kan. (voidable if no consideration); H. 1561, 1988 Mo.; H. 1108, 1988 
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even preferable approach, it is not the only possible approach; sur- 
rogate parenting agreements could be enforced in certain circum- 
stances. First, in order to comply with consent provisions of adoption 
laws, they must not provide for the biological mother to receive a 
fee over and above the reimbursements she would be entitled to 
under state adoption laws.204 Although this proposal may reduce or 
virtually eliminate the pool of women who will agree to act as 
surrogates,205 it is necessary to protect the child's interests.206 Second, 
N.H.  (court approval required); A. 956, 1988 N.J.; S. 2468, 1988 N.J.; A. 2403, 
1987 N.Y.; A. 47481s'. 1429, 1987 N.Y.; A. 5529, 1987 N.Y. (prohibits consid- 
eration); A. 9857, 1988 N.Y.; H .  776, 1987 Pa.; S. 742, 1987 Pa.; H. 8419, 1988 
R.I.; S. 626, 1987 S.C.; H. 549, 1988 Vt.; H .  1529, 1988 Wash.; A. 827, 1988 
Wis. Many states have had multiple bills proposed ranging from complete pro- 
hibition to regulated enforceability. 
In  addition to the proposed bills, a number of states have proposed and/or 
established special commissions to study the issue of surrogate parenting. See S. 
548, 1987 Cal.; S.J. Res. 4 ,  1987 Del.; H.J. Res. 80, 1987 111.; H. 1148, 1988 
Mass.; S. 239, 1987 Me.; S. 871, 1987 N.C.; H .  1098, 1988 N.H.;  A.J. Res. 5, 
1988 N.J.; H .  Res. 93, 1987 Pa.; S. 2413, 1988 R.I . ;  H. 1 7 ,  1988 Utah; H.J. 
Res. 65, 1988 Va.; A.J. Res. 7 1 ,  1987 Wis. 
O n  the national level, Democratic Representative Barbara Boxer and Repub- 
lican Representative Henry Hyde are jointly sponsoring legislation against surrogate 
parenting. The bill would make surrogate parenting contracts unenforceable and 
would penalize intermediaries. H.R.  1188, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). See N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 3, 1989, at A1 1 ,  col. 1 .  
204. For a discussion of permissible reimbursements, see supra notes 100-101 
and accompanying text. The New York State Task Force, stated that the adopting 
couple "would be allowed to pay the same expenses that other adoptive parents 
could pay to or on behalf of a mother who consents to the adoption of her child" 
but no more. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at A-2. "Allowable expenses 
would include the birth mother's medical fees and other necessary expenses arising 
from her pregnancy and the child's birth. They would also include reasonable 
expenses for legal services related to the adoption proceeding, but would not permit 
a 'finder's fee' or payment for the child." Id. 
205. Most women would not agree to act as a surrogatewithout a substantial 
fee. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
206. The foregoing analysis is of little use in a situation where a child has 
already been born pursuant to a surrogacy agreement or in those states that decide 
to permit surrogate parenting agreements. In these situations, the issue of custody 
remains. It has been suggested that a "best interest of the child" standard would 
be inappropriate to decide the custody issue because it would normally result in 
custody being awarded to the adopting couple who are likely to have more money 
and be better educated than the surrogate. See Wolf, supra note 9, at 398-99. But 
one of the major concerns about surrogacy is that it fails to adequately protect 
the welfare of the child. Once a child is born, custody decisions should be based 
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surrogate parenting agreements must be restructured to give the 
biological mother a period of time to change her mind after the 
birth of the child. This would be consistent with adoption statuteszo7 
and is essential if the surrogate's interests are to be sufficiently 
protected. Moreover, she should be advised following the birth of 
the child of her right to void the contract. Without a personal 
counselling session, the surrogate may comply with the provisions 
of the surrogate parenting agreement simply because she is unaware 
of her right to do otherwise. In circumstances where the surrogate 
parenting agreement is incompatible with adoption statutes solely 
because it fails to comply with adoption consent requirements, the 
surrogate parenting agreement should be voidable. This situation is 
analogous to a situation in which one party to a contract lacks 
capacity.208 In such cases, the contract is generally voidable at the 
option of the party lacking capacity.209 The surrogate parenting 
agreement should also be voidable where the surrogate's consent is 
vitiated.210 
on his or her welfare. The best interest standard is designed to do this and should 
be used even if this would genelally favor the natural father because this is the 
standard which is most likely to protect the child. As the court in In re Adoption 
of Baby Girl L.J., 132 Misc. 2d 972, 974, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 815 (Surr. Ct. 
1986) explained when confronted with the existence of a child born pursuant to a 
surrogate parenting agreement: 
The  reality is that the child is in being and of necessity must be reared 
by parents. The court . . . has found . . . that it would be in the best 
interests of the child to approve the adoption [by the biological father 
and his wife]. No other alternative, such as denying the adoption for 
the purpose of discouraging such procedures, is appropriate here. This 
child needs a home . . . . 
See also Baby M, in which the trial court also applied the best interest standard 
in determining that the biological father and his wife should be given custody of 
Baby M. 217 N.J. Super. 313, 390-98, 525 A.2d 1128, 1166-71 (Super. Ct.  App. 
Div. 1987). The custody determination was affirmed on appeal. 109 N.J. at 452- 
63, 537 A.2d at 1255-61. 
In Michigan, the Surrogate Parenting Act provides that while surrogate par- 
enting agreements are unenforceable, "[ilf a child is born . . . pursuant to a 
surrogate parentage contract . . . [tlhe . . .court shall award legal custody of the 
child based on a determination of the best interests of the child." Surrogate 
Parenting Act, supra note 192, at § 11. 
207. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
208. See supra note 20. 
209. See supra note 20. 
210. In other words, all surrogate parenting agreements should be voidable - 
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If, however, a surrogate parenting agreement also violates baby- 
selling prohibitions, it should be considered void. An impermissible 
fee not only vitiates consent, but threatens to create a black market 
in b a b y - ~ e l l i n g . ~ ~ ~  Such an agreement should not be enforced at 
Finally, the state must determine the fitness of the adopting 
couple just as it would investigate the fitness of any other adopting 
parents. The investigation should be made prior to the insemination 
of the surrogate. Once the investigation has been made and the 
adopting couple has been found fit ,  the surrogate parenting process 
can proceed within the limitations set forth above. 
B. Surrogacy and Society at Large 
Although surrogate parenting agreements may be enforceable if 
they meet the foregoing limitations, they are not desirable. While 
surrogate parenting is an attempt to create a new form of independent 
adoption, it has much less to recommend it than traditional adoptions, 
whether independent or agency. Under current adoption statutes the 
state's interest is to protect the welfare of a child whose parents are 
unable or unwilling to provide for him or her.213 Thus, the state, 
by allowing the adoption, helps to meet the child's needs by providing 
a mechanism by which the child may be placed with an adoptive 
family. The key, though, is that adoption statutes came into being 
to address a need - the need to care for existing children without 
homes.214 The state interest in meeting the needs of these children 
either by express provision, allowing the biological mother to change her mind 
after the child's birth, or  as a matter of law. Admittedly, this approach is pater- 
nalistic. Nonetheless, because an  agreement to surrender a child is different in 
kind and not just in degree from other agreements, this added protection of the 
biological mother is justified. 
21 1. O n  the other hand, it may be argued that the refusal to enforce surrogate 
parenting agreements will simply reduce further the number of healthy white 
babies - which, in turn,  will strengthen the black market in baby-selling. 
212. Cf. S. 620, 1988 Sess. § 1, 1988 Kan. (Proposed bill would render 
surrogate parenting agreements for consideration void, while rendering surrogate 
parenting agreements without consideration voidable.). 
213. Note, Matching For Adoption: A Study of Current Trends, 22 C A T H .  LAW. 
70 (1976) ("Theoretically, the primary purpose of adoption procedures is to serve 
the best interests of the child."). 
214. Barwin v. Reidy, 62 N.W. 183, 190, 307 P.2d 175, 180 (1957) ("[Tlhe 
purpose of s ta tu tes  for adopt ion is to make provision for  the  welfare of 
children . . . ."). 
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resulted in the adoption statutes currently in force in every state.215 
Surrogate parenting exists, however, not to meet the needs of 
children, but to meet the desires of the adopting couple. Therefore, 
at the outset there is lacking in the practice of surrogate parenting 
the state interest present in traditional adoptions of meeting the 
needs of existing Moreover, there are thousands of ex- 
isting children in this country who desperately need homes.217 The 
need for homes for foster children is well documented.218 There are 
also many children available for adoption.219 Of course, many foster 
children are not infants and may have a variety of physical and/or 
mental health problems.220 Moreover, they are disproportionately 
215. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 35 ("Adoption statutes were 
designed to benefit children in need of parents."); Derdeyn & Wadlington, Adoption: 
The Rights of Parents Versus the Best Interests of Their Children, 16 J .  AM. ACAD. CHILD 
PSYCHIATRY 1 (1977); Huard, The L a w  of Adoption, Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L.  
REV. 743, 748-49 (1956). 
216. See Means, supra note 1 ,  at 466-67 ("Adoption is the societal method 
of providing for the necessity of the child. A surrogacy agreement is an agreement 
by adults, of adults, and for adults, which they designed to satisfy their own needs 
and (some would add) greeds. No necessity of any child prompts such an 
agreement. "). 
217. There are thousands of children in foster homes, many of whom are 
available for adoption. There are also minority, handicapped, and foreign children 
available for adoption. See infra note 227 and accompanying text. See also Mushlin, 
Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster Children from Abuse and 
Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 199, 201 (1988). 
There may also be other children who are adversely affected by surrogate 
parenting agreements - other children of the surrogate. In Baby M ,  for example, 
Mary Beth Whitehead, the surrogate, already had two children when she agreed 
to become a surrogate. These children were undoubtedly affected by the surrogate 
arrangement. Mary Beth Whitehead actually fled to another state with Baby M 
after the birth in a desperate attempt to avoid being separated from her child. 109 
N.J. at 415-16, 537 A.2d at 1237. Even in surrogate parenting situations which 
proceed without incident, the children of the surrogate will presumably be affected 
by the fact that their mother is pregnant for nine months, delivers a baby, but 
fails to bring the child home. 
218. Mushlin, supra note 217; N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1988, at B1, col. 2 
("In New York City's glutted foster care system . . . there are not enough families 
to go around."). 
219. There are "thousands of black and bi-racial children who wait for 
permanent homes." ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 63, at 32. 
220. There were 274,000 "special needs" children in foster care in 1982. 
Although many of them were free for adoption, only 9,591 adoptions by foster 
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racial or ethnic rn inor i t i e~ .~~ '  Like any other group, the group of 
foster children is composed of individuals, each with his or her own 
personality. If more couples opened their homes to these children it 
would serve a number of purposes. First, the child who wants and 
needs a home would have one. Second, the couple that wants to 
care for a child would have one. Third, a child who is well cared 
for would be more likely to grow up happy and healthy and become 
a productive member of society than one who is homeless, neglected, 
or abused. In addition, for the couple willing to take in a child of 
a different race or religion, there is an opportunity for both the 
parents and child to become more sensitive to their cultural differ- 
ences while appreciating their similarities.222 Such adoptions might 
help to achieve Dr. Martin Luther King's dream that individuals 
"not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their 
If some of the couples who so desperately want children 
would consider opening their hearts and homes to children already 
born, society would benefit. While the existence of children available 
for adoption does not render surrogate parenting agreements unen- 
forceable, it does illustrate that surrogate parenting may do more 
harm than good for society at large. 
parents occurred during that year. Id .  at 11. "Special needs" children include 
those "who may be difficult to place due to ethnic background, age, membership 
in a minority o r  sibling group, or the presence of physical, emotional or mental 
handicaps." Id .  at 41. 
221. A study conducted by the National Committee for Adoption, based on 
1982 data, noted that "[bllack children constitute 14 percent of the child population, 
34 percent of foster care, and 41 percent of children free for adoption." Id .  at 
11. See also i d .  at 35 (citing 1984 DHHS report finding similar results). "Regrettably, 
there is a consistently poor record in finding adoptive homes for these black 
children." Id .  at 32. 
222. Transracial adoptions are controversial. In fact, the National Association 
of Black Social Workers has taken the position that they should not be permitted 
at all because it will amount to "cultural genocide." Id .  at 32. The focus, however, 
should be on the best interest of the child. While it may be preferable to place a 
child with a family of the same racial or ethnic background, the child will un- 
doubtedly be better off living with a loving family, regardless of racial or ethnic 
background, than living in an impersonal state-run institution. Of course, the state 
agencies which arrange adoptions must also ensure that their procedures are fair 
and do  not make adoption more difficult for minorities than for whites. See generally 
id. at 32-34. 
223. M .  L. King, J r . ,  March on Washington Speech (Aug. 28, 1963), reprinted 
in L .  DAVIS, I HAVE A DREAM . . . THE LIFE AND TIMES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, 
JR. 263 (1969). 
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Surrogacy for pay is incompatible with baby-selling prohibitions 
and must be prohibited. Surrogate parenting agreements could be 
made, however, where no fee would be paid to the surrogate over 
and above the fees currently allowed under the adoption laws. In 
addition, some mechanism must be established for investigating the 
adopting couple's fitness as parents. Finally, surrogate parenting 
agreements would have to give the biological mother a period of 
time after the child is born to decide whether she wants to surrender 
the child. Otherwise, the surrogate parenting agreement would be 
voidable at her option. If she decides not to surrender the child, a 
custody decision must be made based on the best interest of the 
child without regard to the surrogate agreement. Despite the fact 
that surrogate parenting agreements can be made to conform to 
adoption statutes, society would be better served if infertile couples 
would provide a home for some of the thousands of children currently 
awaiting adoption. 
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